Topic: The Fall Of Liverpool - from "Pay As You Play" (Tomkins, Riley and Fulcher)

[royhendo]

This is my section from part 2 of "Pay As You Play" by Tomkins, Riley and Fulcher. Feel free to tear it to shreds. In the post below, I've added a wee review of the book. It's my personal opinion on it, and I've added full disclosure of my contribution to it - I won't earn anything from the book, in case you're wondering. I'm just enthusiastic about what it represents.

Note - the comment on 'men in suits' was written at the height of the summer's Scallyban activities. No offence to anyone now wearing their best Marks n Sparks at the club.

---

THE FALL OF LIVERPOOL

In an interview ahead of his testimonial in September 2010, Jamie Carragher, when asked what he would say to “Alex Ferguson if he ever met him, said “I’d say he never ‘knocked Liverpool off their f*cking perch’. That’s nonsense that. Graeme Souness did that. United were competing with Norwich and Aston Villa for their first title. They weren’t competing with Liverpool, were they?”

Carragher’s statement raises an interesting question. What was it that triggered Liverpool Football Club’s decline from domination of domestic and European football to relative also-rans on both fronts? There are many factors to consider, but in 2010, possibly more than ever before, the fundamental one is clear. To dominate, you need economic muscle. If you want to be sat on your perch, it’s nigh on impossible to stay there for too long without it.

But what if you no longer have that economic muscle? What if other sides have more economic muscle than you do? If you have any hope of being successful in that context, you need some miraculous combination of reasonable investment, organisational vision (and congruence at all levels), commitment, patience, and last but not least, a knack for investing your money well – at least as well if not better than your competitors.

In fact, if your competitors are better funded than you are, you better pray they lack some or all of those things.

So where does that leave Graeme Souness? When he took over at Liverpool in the Spring of 1991, economic muscle wasn’t a problem. The club was still something of a juggernaut with a momentum all of its own. While it was maybe beginning its relative decline in both financial and strategic terms, it was still one of the biggest spenders in English football, and adding to an already phenomenal playing staff. It’s not too outrageous a statement to suggest that without dramatic changes in the transfer market, Liverpool could have sustained its momentum for several more years without suffering too much.

Though now ageing, the team Souness inherited had won the league the year before, and his first handful of games saw the side clinch a close second in the league to winners Arsenal despite the sudden departure of Kenny Dalglish – a massive shock to the club and to the city as a whole. So while the squad was no doubt experiencing turmoil following Kenny’s departure, it might have been wiser not to disrupt things too much, and to keep the juggernaut on the rails a little longer while a few tweaks were made.

As it was, we saw a sage lesson in how to squander economic muscle, and how to dissipate a juggernaut’s momentum. Souness started out with rich resources at his disposal. He inherited a squad of proven winners, a club with the ability to consistently nurture its own players and relatively cheap buys from lower divisions through to first team duty, and an ability to go toe-to-toe with anyone in the transfer market at the time.

It’s fair to say the prayers of poorer-funded competitors came true. Souness failed to invest his resources wisely. The club itself developed a habit of doing the same, and the two compounded each other to the extent that Liverpool has been playing catch-up ever since.

Certain transfers are emblematic of each manager’s tenure at Liverpool. For Souness, names like Julian Dicks, Torben Piechnik and Paul Stewart can only be said to have been ‘cult heros’ at best. Disasters at worst. On top of that, truly world class players were replaced with players of a lesser standard such as Dean Saunders, Nigel Clough, Mark Wright and Mark Walters, often for huge fees approaching the British transfer record.

That said, he did win an FA Cup in 1992. He also introduced some genuine quality from within the club, and through the tried-and-trusted route of cheap lower division buys – players like Steve McManaman, Robbie Fowler, Jamie Redknapp and Rob Jones. But the decline had set in by that stage, and our competitors had been allowed to carve a proper foothold. It’s fair to say that, on balance, Souness had a disasterous record in the transfer market. Jamie Carragher, while blunt, probably had a point.

Roy Evans stemmed this tide to some extent, and returned the club to its footballing traditions in the process. He also reinstated a sense of value with many of his signings. Names such as Danny Murphy, Paul Ince, and Jason McAteer can only be said to have been good investments for the club in retrospect. Others such as Phil Babb, Oyvind Leonhardsen, Veggard Heggem and Sean Dundee inspire less enthusiasm. And as for Stan Collymore – it’s clear the club might have benefited from a little research into his lifestyle and approach to the game. And that’s possibly the one thing people remember about the players Evans managed at Liverpool – their lifestyles and their approach to the game. It wasn’t always what it could have been. And while they played some great football and brought us close to the pinnacle of the league, it wasn’t enough.

That led to the peculiar introduction of Gerrard Houllier as co-manager, and his eventual replacement of Roy Evans. Again, his signings define both the good and the bad memories of his time with the club. In our minds we have happy memories of a fantastic trophy haul with players like Gary McAllister, Markus Babbel, Didi Hammann, John Arne Riise, and last but not least, Sami Hyypiä.

In the debit column, we remember “10 games from greatness” and players like El Hadj Diouf, Salif Diao, Anthony Le Tallec and Bruno Cheyrou. Other players who came in on big fees divided opinion – players like Emile Heskey, Igor Biscan, Christian Ziege, Harry Kewell and Djibril Cissé. Last but not least, the transition from Evans to Houllier saw the rise of three players who were central to Liverpool’s fortunes in the years that followed – Michael Owen, Steven Gerrard and Jamie Carragher.

But again, external factors played their part. Houllier’s side had been progressing steadily until his heart problems in the Autumn following the club’s FA and Uefa Cup triumphs. He introduced professionalism and dedication to the playing staff, steadily weeding out the players whose lifestyles he didn’t feel fitted the bill. The team, while well organised, was direct and effective and won trophies while claiming the biggest scalps along the way. On his return after his operation, however, his approach changed somewhat. The side began to retreat into its shell, as did he it seems. Coupled with poor investments in the transfer market (mostly related to purchases from France), they saw his management cut short. Poor investments are damaging to a club’s economic muscle, and these problems are often passed on to the next manager.

In 2004, Rafa Benítez inherited a squad that was widely tagged a ‘mixed bag’. Sean Ingle in The Guardian painted a worrying picture of a squad who could not even complete the most basic training drills without error. Benítez quickly moved to bring in his own men in key positions, and his early work in the transfer market was largely excellent. Players like Xabi Alonso and Luis Garcia were fantastic additions and both provided great value over the years. That extends to many of Benítez’s signings over his tenure at the club. There is no argument over players like Reina, Torres or Mascherano.

But in relation to how his work in the transfer market was assessed, Benítez suffered from three fundamental misconceptions on the part of the press.

First, he insisted on squad depth – to an unprecedented degree at the club. It’s one point that’s open to debate – that less ‘rotation’ and fewer players would lead to a tighter, more integrated unit, but the results in the early years spoke for themselves (and rotation is essential for teams who press the opposition and expend energy in the process). Naturally that meant more player purchases than the norm.

Second, Benítez had to ‘trade up’ in the market. His insistence on squad depth, coupled with the club’s relative lack of economic muscle, meant players had to be traded up season by season until they met the level of quality he demanded. To buy a Torres, the club had to juggle available funds and trade up on Cissé, Morientes, Crouch and Bellamy. To buy a Mascherano, we sold Sissoko for £9.2m CTPP.

Lastly, without influence at Academy level (much to his frustration), Benítez effectively assembled an alternative academy at senior level, with many signings aimed at schooling players to his technical and tactical requirements for introduction to the senior squad. This was something of a political battle, but it did impact on his transfer spending. (Benítez finally got control of the Academy in 2009, and installed key men from Barcelona’s famed youth set-up. However, one bad season and the manager was out, although the more aggressive pursuit of top young talent remains.)

Political battles were maybe the key backdrop against which his performance in the transfer market should be judged. In the early years mooted deals for high profile players would regularly fall through – deals that would have removed the need for many subsequent transfers in later years given the prices in question. On top of that, transfers were often second guessed, often publically, to the extent that Benítez was clearly operating with one hand tied behind his back. Next up was the problem of the new American owners, who promised riches but delivered only debt. By the end, Benítez was having to break even.

Despite this, he continued to do good business for the club, largely generating as much in sales as he spent on fees for new players. But as with Houllier, his transfer business in his later years with the club were the subject of heated debate. It’s fair to say that signings like Robbie Keane, Andrea Dossena, Albert Riera and Alberto Aquilani weren’t universally lauded.

Overall, however, the club’s decline both on and off the pitch began with Souness, and was compounded by men in suits behind the scenes – a situation that continues to this day.

[royhendo]

Review - Pay As You Play by Tomkins, Riley and Fulcher

Full disclosure
It's only right to disclose that I had a small involvement in this book, contributing a few pages' worth to end the section on Liverpool FC. My bit's listed above, so feel free to tear it to shreds. All feedback is good feedback.

To the Review
As Liverpool fans, we all know who Paul Tomkins is. There's a thread on here where week in, week out, we to and fro over the merits, demerits and alleged subtext of his standard fayre - or a great part of it - his regular blogs. But as even the most committed detractor would concede, the man is as prolific as he is talented. As well as a mammoth online output, Tomkins has since 2005 published a series of books almost unprecedented in their attention to detail and depth of analysis. Having also been the key columnist on the official club site for several years, it's fair to say we all know who Paul Tomkins is.

But three questions:
- Do you know who Graeme Riley is?
- Do you know who Gary Fulcher is?
- Do you think fans of other clubs know who any of these three are?


The Three Wise Men
I'd suggest that, not too long from now, the answer to all three of those questions will increasingly be 'Yes'. At least amongst a certain cadre of football fan, that is. The reason? They're at the forefront of a movement, and that movement is as inclusive as it is intriguing.

Last month, Tomkins, Riley and Fulcher published "Pay As You Play" after a six-month project led by Tomkins. You might think that's a natural gestation for any standard book project, particularly one where several people are collaborating. But the term "standard book project" doesn't apply - this isn't a standard book. When the postie pops your cardboard package through your letterbox, you'll hear a thunderous crash, because this is a work of almost unprecedented weight. Flick through its pages, and you'll gain access to a repository of data so rich that you wonder how a monster like this could have been borne within those six months. It's a veritable beast.


The Premise
The premise of Pay As You Play (PAYP) is simple - it's been hitherto impossible to achieve genuine like-for-like comparison between clubs, managers, and players. That's true of a static analysis based on the present moment alone, let alone comparison between managers, clubs, and players of different eras. The tools we've thus far used haven't been fit for purpose in that regard. So why not invent better tools?

That's what Tomkins, Riley, Fulcher et al have made a start on here. PAYP represents something fundamentally different to tools like the Guardian Chalkboards, or heat maps, or the various statistical corpora provided by companies like Opta or Actim. These are tools used to provide rudimentary match analyis and assess the microcosmos of a football match. PAYP instead thinks of football clubs and their managers as market operators. Clubs, and the managers at their helm, buy and sell things in what's essentially an open market. Sure, it's an unregulated market plagued with sharks and sheisters, but for the most part clubs are subject to the same advantages and disadvantages faced by companies generally when trading in any market. Some have bigger bargaining power and greater resources to allocate. But what's key is that all of those companies are subjected, either internally or externally, to constant scrutiny of their performance in their chosen markets. The tools developed to perform that scrutiny objectively have, over centuries, become incredibly sophisticated.

In football, on the other hand, we get Messrs Merson, Redknapp and Lawrenson schooling the average football fan on what being 'effective' means in the football transfer market. That is to say, we had no insight into what 'effective' means whatsoever.

In light of that fact, PAYP should have football fans rejoicing the world over. While it's restricted to the English game, and for the moment only to the Premier League and those who have participated in it since its inception in 1992 (they only had six months mind), the principles applied here would apply in exactly the same way in any league, and in any country.


The Transfer Price Index
So - to the tools of their trade. Those who read Tomkins' earlier works "Dynasty" and "Red Race" will be familiar with his "Transfer Price Index". Simply put, this applies a Retail Price Index-type analysis to prices in the football transfer market. As Tomkins himself says:

"In everyday life, most people are familiar with the concept of the Retail Price Index (RPI) as a measure of inflation. A basket of goods is identified and every month the same items are checked to see what the value would be if these were to be purchased. The difference between the current value and that from the previous month is calculated and termed the RPI. By comparing the value this month with the corresponding value for the same month last year, we obtain the RPI.

The same methodology applies to the TPI, except that the "basket" contains every single footballer bought and sold each season, rather than grocery produce (although a few rotten eggs remain)."

Dynasty used this approach to try and assess Liverpool managers, sides and players from different eras on a fair footing, taking their financial and competitive context into account along the way. Red Race took this a step further, comparing Liverpool's market performance in recent seasons against what were then its direct rivals at the top of the table.

PAYP is the next logical extension of this approach. It's the Transfer Price Index approach writ a little larger.


So How Effective Is The Analysis?
It's important in any review not to give too much away, so I won't. All I'll say is that, like any good analysis, it's nice and transparent. It's the underlying data that shines through, and it isn't clouded by spin or agenda. I'll expand on why that's crucial below.

The authors acknowledge that their approach is not without its flaws, and it's that overall acceptance and openness that rings true with the statistical tradition for me. It's split into four parts as follows.

Part 1: introduces the methods used, and identifies the key trends and points of debate from 1992 to the present day.

Part 2: delves into the detail for each of the clubs involved in the Premier League since 1992.

Part 3: switches focus to each of the 18 seasons in turn.

Part 4: assesses the performance of the big managerial names involved.

How effective it is will ultimately be judged by each reader themselves, so all I can do is offer my personal take on things. For me, while there are obvious areas you'd like to see explored further, the book clearly demonstrates both the correlation between financial muscle and success, and the value of this kind of data in comparative assessment. It's a big step in the right direction.


Is It Balanced?
There will inevitably be those who disagree - that always seems to be the case when it comes to Paul Tomkins' work - but for me, balance is baked into this book, and to the entire movement that it's built upon. What would be the point otherwise? Central to the development of this book, (and you would hope of many later books) were Graeme Riley and Dan Kennett, both experts in commercial data analysis. Their expertise enabled constant tweaking to the underlying database, and to the number crunching methods used to read the overall trends. Being experts in what constitutes competitive balance, their reputations depend on their objectivity. How can you make informed decisisons if any kind of agenda skews your representation of your data of the analysis that flows from it?

It's likely that many others talented in these fields will get involved with later developments. That bodes well for us, if not for Messrs Merson, Redknapp and Lawrenson.


A Better Mousetrap?
In comparing the relative merits of analysis based on transfer fees versus analysis based on wages, the book's introduction states: "Neither method is perfect... but as we will outline in this book, we feel that we've found the strongest-ever link between transfer spending and success."

I think that's a fair assertion. The data presented is compelling in itself. But the book's about more than that for me. What's possibly more important is that a. these guys have developed a way to produce and self-publish a book of phenomenal quality in only six months, and b. they've demonstrated a commitment to openness, transparency, challenge, and constant refinement, and that commitment is built into the very fabric of their approach. 

It's that spirit that will, you hope, eventually help build the kind of mousetrap we need.


Hopes For The Future
One thing that's clear about Paul Tomkins is that he's a man who responds positively to a challenge. So it's with that spirit in mind that I hope he truly pushes the power of this idea and helps reinforce and build on the genuinely enlightened thinking that currently goes into our analysis of the game. Ex players and media hacks serve us up the same old nonsense week in and week out, and have done for years. In the process we never really get much insight into what makes the game tick. And while this isn't the only front on which fans need to take the game back, it's one front where we can really make inroads into 'enemy' lines. All we need is access to the data, a few clever heads to knock together, and a few more with the ability to present the insight it creates in a way that's accessible to the day-to-day fan.

People are excited about the idea. Only three weeks ago I spoke to an illustrator for a well-known children's comic and he started to wonder how you could make this kind of information accessible to school kids. It's quite a challenge when you think about it like that. But ultimately it should be the aim if this movement's really going to change things.

PAYP makes an excellent start in that direction. The writing is clear and direct, making a subject that could be dry and intractable both engaging and intuitive to understand. The use of standard graphs and infographics is intriguing to me, as it's an area I'm fascinated in. I remember suggesting a few months ago that by applying the principles of Edward Tufte, Tomkins and his compadres could really bring the findings of this work home to your average fan. Taking one look at the heat map graphic from PAYP, which plots the trends in competitive balance since 1992, you realise that this spirit is central to the group's work. To be honest, it makes you want to throw yourself in there and get involved.

Along with developing better tools for genuinely insighful and objective analysis, you can only hope as much effort goes into keeping the information engaging for users. On that front, I'll be reporting for duty - but then it's my hobby anyway.

I guess the best way to sum up my hopes is this: I'll meet you all for a pint at the close of the 15th annual International TPI Convention in 2028. 

[Lofty Ambitions]

Thanks royhendo, top stuff once again

Oh the day when Xabi and Lil'Luis signed for us. Feels already like a lifetime ago 

May the golden sky soon (re)appear!

[Ryan M]

Interesting review Roy. Been considering writing this on my Christmas Wish List. Cheers for that information. Can see me asking Santa for this. Recently I've been wanting to read more in-depth analysis on football. Think this will help.

[Mad Men]

Sorry, but Julian Dicks, Torben Piechnik and Paul Stewart  were and are NOT cult hero's.

Ronnie Rosenthal, Craig Johnston, Henchoz, Paul Walsh were cult hero's.

[royhendo]

It's a euphemism, that's for sure.

[Hazell]

I'm sure Dalglish bought Redknapp.

[Cassiel]

Cheers mate - the Roy we can all like as I like to think of you 

This one is definitely on my list for Santa. That and a pancake pan and I'm fucking made up this xmas, I tell you.

[Pritch]

I've nearly finished it, it really is a fantastic book.

Was a surprise to see a RAWKite get a few pages, but your piece was fantastic royhendo.

Id recommend it to anyone, the Transfer Price Index is pretty ingenious, only problem is Fat Sam comes out smelling of roses, but hey the stats don't lie.

[GeneticRed]

Sorry, but Julian Dicks, Torben Piechnik and Paul Stewart  were and are NOT cult hero's.

Ronnie Rosenthal, Craig Johnston, Henchoz, Paul Walsh were cult hero's.

Piechnik was a bit to be fair. But Dicks and Stewart were defo not.
We expected alot more from Dicks and Stewart because their fees were higher and they came with a better reputation than Torben. He was just plucked out of obscurity and did an ok job at the time whereas the other two let us down big time.

[royhendo]

I'm sure Dalglish bought Redknapp.

Yup, but Souness introduced him, no?

[JohnBarnesBigToe]

Yup, but Souness introduced him, no?

Yeah, made a couple of sub appearances under Kenny I think.

[DonkeyWan]

Needs more context. it's one thing to focus on the failings of the club internally, but lets not forget the rebranding exercise undertaken by Sky has made the whole process much more money and media driven. The success of United and its timing became a vehicle for Sky to launch its coverage and from early on United and Sky were synonymous, two brands developing together and with a  positive feedback loop that kept United top of the pile and allowed them to become the monolith that they are.

It was in this environment that Liverpool were trying to compete and the only way anyone could compete was in terms of money. Blackburn succeeded and Liverpool failed. That for me is the story of the 90s, huge cash gambles failing to pay off. The last two decades has been about United success and Liverpool failing to maintain parity. Only two teams have threatened that hegemony. Arsenal, with limited resources put together a team that finally wrested dominance from united. However, since that early gooner success United have poured even more funds in and Arsenal have been forced into retreat. Into their stead has come Chelsea, a billionaire's plaything. Even they are running out of steam. Thankfully Man City have stepped up to the mark and will challenge United for the foreseeable.

The point here is, to focus only on the shortcomings of the club is to overlook the obvious, not so much the decline of Liverpool but the corporatisation of the game and United's readiness to become top dog by wholly engaging with the corporate teat. It's unsavoury but successful Unfortunately the result is a warped football system, one so bad that the most successful team of the last two decades has seen a group of disillusioned fans break away and set up their own team. What's even more depressing is that Liverpool are now going down the same route, in an effort to compete.

I remember the disquiet when united first went PLC. The fears, that ultimately proved true, that such a route would isolate the real fan and promote the prawn sandwich eater. That is the route that Liverpool are now on and in truth it feels unavoidable, such is the manner in which the PL is now pursued by competing billionaires. Its sad but there is no longer any place for a community club in the top sphere of the PL. The last two decades of Liverpudlian decline have basically been the death throes of that model of football club, that vision. It really is adapt or die. Now we have (ostensibly) well-meaning but football-wise, clueless owners the transition feels complete.Who is to blame? Sky, the money pimp? United its whore? No, the answer is the FA for suckling on the devil's tits like a starving wain.

[Hazell]

Yup, but Souness introduced him, no?

Ah right fair enough. I'm too young to remember.

[Breitner]

You can't really talk about the downfall of Liverpool without mentioning the impact that Hillsborough had on everyone involved. We were in free fall long before Souness walked in the door, and it was never as simple as just a few bad signings. And being hyper critical I'm not sure we really need to read yet another account of our 'demise', which has been analysed to death since 1990. To me it's just smacks of defeatism.

Other than that it's well written and informative, if a little biased towards Rafa.

[royhendo]

You can't really talk about the downfall of Liverpool without mentioning the impact that Hillsborough had on everyone involved. We were in free fall long before Souness walked in the door, and it was never as simple as just a few bad signings. And being hyper critical I'm not sure we really need to read yet another account of our 'demise', which has been analysed to death since 1990. To me it's just smacks of defeatism.

Other than that it's well written and informative, if a little biased towards Rafa.

Simply because that was the brief Breitner. I only hint at it obliquely, but the book's about the stats from 1992 to the present day, and that's the story presented by the stats, in my opinion. No disrespect intended.

[Hazell]

Other than that it's well written and informative, if a little biased towards Rafa.

Just couldn't resist eh?

[SalisburyRed]

I was going to wait 'til Christmas to get this, but having read your contribution and review royhendo I've just ordered it on Amazon. I'm looking forward to it.

[royhendo]

.

As I say mate, the brief was a short article on what the stats told you, and that was the story. You'll see much the same from Oliver Kay. All fair comment from you though and probably worthy of a book in itself.

[flying red]

Like your contribution and the review.

My memory of Houllier's time includes the signing of Rigobert Song, Titi Camara and Sander Westerveld who all made fairly colourful contributions. Wasn't Kirkland signed on the same day as Westerveld?

[royhendo]

I reckon the best way to set the context thing is to go and see what they say themselves lads: http://t.co/6vBJwIt

The main point is that my wee snippet is a drop in a very big ocean of a book, where there's comment on every club along these lines, based on people's reading of the stats. Very interesting stuff, regardless of your take - you can draw your own interpretations, you know?

[DonkeyWan]

Can I ask, where does the book rate Benitez?

[SalisburyRed]

Can I ask, where does the book rate Benitez?

According to this article, it seems to rate him fairly highly.

[the 92A]

Thought is was a sound analysis Roy, agree that it would be further improved with the context that donkey wan introduced but accept that this may have been outside the brief. That was a period of major restructuring of the financial framework and falling at that time compounded our problems due to what was going on elsewhere. Disagree that it's defeatist, there can never be too much decent analysis of where we went wrong so that we learn from rather than repeat past mistakes. Look forward to Tomkins et al's book is it available now?

[royhendo]

Can I ask, where does the book rate Benitez?

Behind Mourinho, Ferguson and Wenger. And the rating is transparent - the same rules are applied to all managers.

Edit: there's more to it than that obviously - some of them are ahead on some criteria, others on others. The points ratings are pretty close. Plenty of scope for debate.

[Vulmea]

err can you stop pllugging this book - I've asked for it for christmas - which means my kids'l order it on christmas eve and it'll be sold out

like the way you sex up statistical analysis - we are talking maths here right?

to catch on with kids - simple is good, demonstrable is better

anything which gets rid of merson, lawrenson and redknapp is a universal good

on the decline - i suspect we tried to buy rather than build success as united tried for 20 years before -i'd think that'd mean more money spent on older players however paradoxically my ailing mind thinks we had more home grown kids come through than any other decade.........

also key I believe was the change in football - we might have cornered the market in british talent but the game opened up and we didn't dominate scouting those new areas as we had the old ones

there was also the introduction of an english players only rule which buggered us up

and if you believe the mancs when they got rid of the back pass rule our style of play was lost forever -

thought provoking and nearly right as always

[Breitner]

Simply because that was the brief Breitner. I only hint at it obliquely, but the book's about the stats from 1992 to the present day, and that's the story presented by the stats, in my opinion. No disrespect intended.

None taken, mate, it's an interesting subject.

[royhendo]

Top man Breitner.

I reckon that's right Vulmea - the guy I spoke to is my next door neighbour and he illustrates for The Beano and The Dandy as well as working on sports mags for the publisher he works for. Really interesting stuff - me and you would bore the arses off wurselves discussing it dude.

[Stussy]

Outstanding work Roy.

[JP-65]

Outstanding work Roy.

To be clear, it's Rrrrroy, just to keep him separate from Hodgson

[sideshowme]

Like your contribution and the review.

My memory of Houllier's time includes the signing of Rigobert Song, Titi Camara and Sander Westerveld who all made fairly colourful contributions. Wasn't Kirkland signed on the same day as Westerveld?

i think kirkland was signed on the same day as dudek.  i might be misremembering though.

great read by the way.  i'll hunt the book out.  was it really self-published?  they seem to have got some great distribution if so...

[Not funny reecehenebry]

Does it take boardroom problems into account.
For example Jose's problems with Grant and Fergie's with the Irish owners.

Or even Arsenal's building of a new ground?

[royhendo]

There's debate thrown up by the stats Reece, yup.

[PaulF]

I've nearly finished it, it really is a fantastic book.

Was a surprise to see a RAWKite get a few pages, but your piece was fantastic royhendo.

Id recommend it to anyone, the Transfer Price Index is pretty ingenious, only problem is Fat Sam comes out smelling of roses, but hey the stats don't lie.

Tomkins was a regular on here, and although he rattled a few people's cages, he often wrote well thought out pieces and won a lot of friends.  I'm sure he lurks under a pseudonym still.

[JP-65]

Tomkins was a regular on here, and although he rattled a few people's cages, he often wrote well thought out pieces and won a lot of friends.  I'm sure he lurks under a pseudonym still.

Paul lurks, but as a guest, I believe.

[Legendary]

Top stuff. Planning on ordering it for xmas

[conman]

Top stuff. Planning on ordering it for xmas

part of my plans too..

Good stuff Roy.

[Hal9000]

Who is to blame? Sky, the money pimp? United its whore? No, the answer is the FA for suckling on the devil's tits like a starving wain.

I'd just add a response to your v good post here. I think the FA are now so weak in the face of the commercial muscle of the top PL clubs and the possibility of them breaking away to join with European clubs, they have to bow to them and their powerful CEOs and managers. Hence the inaction against  'prominent' managers and players who flaunt the regulations, abuse refs, tap up players...etc. The big clubs call all the shots now imo.

Great thread this, just bought the book and now looking forward to reading it even more.

.

[xerxes1]

A good post by Roy and follow up by DW.

Empires wax and wane driven by planning, skill, circumstance and luck. I think DW is right to emphasise the quantum shift in the macro-economic football landscape, but I would not agree that it favoured Man U exclusively. The pain of Hillsborough paralysed the club at a crucial time. The Board failed to grasp the opportunities that the Taylor Report presented. Souness looked a good shout at the time.

Watching Barca destroy Madrid the other night I was struck not so much by how they should be the model for us, bit how we were the model for them.

Our Board was British, established, and knowledgeable - Barca's is Spanish, established and knowledgeable. The Liverpool/ Barca way is understood. They promoted Guardiola from the playing ranks as we did Dalglish. Dalglish continued the Fagan/ Paisley era as Guardiola has sustained the Rijkaard era. their team is predominantly Spanish/ Hispanic in the same way as ours was English/ British.

On the one heand, when you look at our post 90 trophy haul, we havent done so bad. On the other you have to say that at the moment, out ability to even match the past 20 years, let alone emulate the glory years, is uncertain.

[That Kennedy moment]

Good stuff Roy.

Excellent reply from Donkey Wan - I'd echo that in full. Breitner's right, too, about Hillsborough - it decimated the club for many years. Just because it was pre-1992, don't fall into Sky's Year Zero way of thinking - that we all started with a clean slate in 1992, and nothing that went before mattered. We were on tranquilisers for 5 or 6 years.

One other point about Utd, which is so obvious but bears repeating: they were blessed with an outstanding crop of young players, who would form the core of that team for a decade, and in Giggs' and Scholes' case, nearly two decades. That, allied to their commercial nous, made them all but unassailable.

Any club playing catch-up inevitably flounders and overreaches, makes mistakes and bad buys - you're operating from a position of some desperation, and you have to take more risks.

The nature of the Premiership, combined with the advent of 24-hr news cycle, inevitably shortens people's patience, and increases their demand for instant/quicker results. It militates against the type of rebuilding we needed. Make people pay £40 a ticket for a seat and they demand. Charge them £2.70 to stand on The Kop and they support.