Liverpool v SunderlandRather than focus on the game itself as a game of two teams, I think it is important to focus more on Liverpool after this game, because quite frankly that game was the best example of what Rodgers is looking to achieve on a broader scale. The game had everything – Possession, Pressure, Goals and Shots on Target, Mobility, Balance and more importantly, Cohesion. It was not even a perfect performance. The overall key factor from the game, from a fans point of view, is that Rodgers must be allowed to realize his vision – both from the fan support aspect and from the owner’s perspective. He needs time, encouragement and funds (allied to control of who comes in and who goes out). The reason for this is simple – if he doesn’t get the support and time here, another big club will give it to him, and he could create something special there instead.
“Death by Passing” and Sunderland’s System -What we saw yesterday was not quite the culmination of Rodgers’ work, but a major pointer in the right direction. It was, for all intents and purposes, “Death by Passing”. People are disinclined here to give the team and manager any credit for these recent dominant wins, claiming the lack of talent of the other team on the day. The truth, though, is somewhere in the middle between them being bad and us being good. The QPR that looked soulless and lost in the last game went out and beat Chelsea away. The Fulham that were tanked 4-0 were 2-1 winners AT West Bromwich Albion, a few people’s dark horses for a Champions League spot.
And so it was that the Sunderland who have picked up form in recent games and have beaten the League Champions were made to look like pub league amateurs constantly chasing the ball like a cat chasing a ball of string. Certainly, they didn’t play to their full potential, but once they missed their second clear chance on goal, they weren’t seeing much of the ball for the rest of the game – a fluid midfield, a suffocating front line and the engine of Jordan Henderson made sure of that. For the sake of fairness, let’s look at how Sunderland ended up having to play:
The first thing we can see is that their midfield and forward shape were dragged all over the pitch. Because of the strength of Sterling and Suarez connecting, McClean had to play deep and double up on Raheem. Although they ostensibly played a 4-4-1-1, and although their back four with Colback in front kept their shape at least, the midfield and forward set-up was a shapeless mess in reality, being forced to chase the ball all over the width and depth of the field. And if they thought they had some respite from the possession at any time once Liverpool got beyond the 6th pass, there was Gerrard dropping deep into the right defensive third space to receive and launch passes Suarez.
Although Sunderland have been prone to sitting deep under O’Neill, the quality of ball and player mobility from Liverpool forced the back four to push up just to stay connected to their rudderless midfield. This is what created the ample space for Liverpool to attack into. The quality of the combination patterns, the direct passes from Gerrard and Suarez, and the midfield runs from deep ensured that no matter what plans Sunderland had for the game, our early goal would ensure that their plans would be a footnote to the game, rather than the narration of it. They didn’t play to their potential, but to give Liverpool and the manager credit, they weren’t allowed to. To do that, you have to get the ball, and when you get it, you have to attack an unbalanced defence. Thankfully, they neither got much of the ball, nor did they face a shapeless and open backline.
Liverpool’s System – I asked earlier if anyone wanted to hazard a guess at what our actual formation played out as, according to player roles rather than what was on paper. Most guessed at a 4-2-3-1, and there wouldn’t be anything wrong with that assessment, as there was a solidity to our play that would indicate that. However, the solidity, I believe, came more from the balance of the team through the thirds and in the channels, and we covered the field very, very well, without sacrificing defensive solidity. For all intents and purposes, we lined up tactically like we have done for a lot of the season (and which I proposed in the Preview thread):
We can see the high-positioned back four, the defensive midfielder, the runner, and the “Controller”/Playmaker in central midfield, and the recessed wingers/inside forwards with Suarez central and high up front. We didn’t stray too much from that shape at all, except where we DID make an alteration, we created almost a whole new system which was a hybrid of systems that the players seemed comfortable with:
What we first notice here is that Lucas played closer to Agger and Skrtel than he usually does, which had the effect of plugging that central gap I talked about in the Back-Three thread. Agger and Skrtel also played relatively closer to the central channel, splitting only on certain triggers (Reina on goalkicks, Reina receiving a back pass, etc). After the ball entered the central and attacking thirds, Agger and Skrtel became a bit more conservative. This is something a few posters mentioned in that Back-Three thread, including myself, as a way of mitigating that large space in the middle. Combine that with Lucas playing deeper than usual, and we had a central defensive channel covered by three players no more than 10 yards apart, meaning we covered 20-30 yards of central space with 3 players, rather than leaving a 30 yard space being covered by one (Lucas). This allowed the fullbacks to comfortably get forward into the attack, as evident by the number of forays forward into the edge of the box that both Wisdom and Johnson made, with both having good chances to shoot on target. With Lucas dropping back, though, and the fullbacks being wide, Gerrard found himself with a lot more space to drop into to receive the ball, allowing him to assess the runs of the forward players, or switch the play our of pressure in the channels when necessary.
The second part of this space created was due to the unrelenting pressure that Henderson put on the Sunderland midfielders and back four. In all, the workload and positional play of the trio showed how a Rodgers midfield works when the right people are in the right positions. You can almost imagine why a player like Sahin would appeal to Rodgers in this scenario, as the runner and the holding mid would create a huge pocket of space for the controller to “quarterback” the game. Up front, Downing had another good game, working hard, showing a bit of flash, and a good understanding with him, Henderson and Suarez has been recently evident. Sterling and Suarez have a clear mentor relationship, and that could be a forward partnership to look out for over the years. The only positional relationship which didn’t materialize was between Wisdom and Sterling, who clearly didn’t know each other’s style of play too well, and didn’t seem to be on the same page the way Johnson and Downing usually are. All-in-all, the shape of the team and the play was as close as we’ve been to the ideal Rodgers team this season.
Echoes of History –However, the positives don’t end there. If we look again at the formation, and the roles played, we can see from the diagrams that although we played a 4-3-3 on paper, in terms of positions and tasks, we actually played a 3-4-3. The gap between midfield still existed, even though the gap between the two central defenders was consolidated with Lucas. The workrate of Gerrard and Henderson, though, more or less nullified that space, except for the one passage of play when they cut through us with some good give and go’s. What is noticeable is that our front three pressed Sunderland into their defensive third quite aggressively, backed up by another line of three (Johnson – Henderson – Wisdom), with Gerrard almost sweeping up behind them, and Lucas, Agger and Skrtel taking care of the offside space.
In effect, we were pressing their back four with seven players, and when we won the ball, we opened up and created good width and depth. We can see this by the positions of the team across the three channels – the central channel is well stocked with the spine of the team – Lucas, Gerrard, Henderson, and Suarez. The wide channels were equally balanced with at least Downing-Johnson and Sterling-Wisdom doubling up in the channels, with Agger and Skrtel playing half-and-half roles in defending the channels and the central defensive zone. In effect, we were playing a 3-4-3 (or a 3-1-3-3 to be technical, with Gerrard as the “1”). This was encouraging, because positiionally on paper, we weren’t playing with three central defenders, we didn’t have a midfield four, and the two outside attackers were true wingers on their strong sides. If you’re an opposition manager and team preparing in any way all week to play against a 4-3-3, then these positional changes were really going to make you dizzy. It’s a very difficult formation to play against, and it has a good solid precedent in the past from one of the great teams that could be said to be a model almost more than Barca are for what we’re trying to achieve: the Ajax team of 1995. If we look below...
…. We can see that Ajax played positionally much the same way as we did against Sunderland, with the main difference being the more dedicated central positioning of Blind at the back and Rijkaard being the general. Similarly, the outside central mids were actual central midfielders, but as someone pointed out earlier, it seemed at times that Johnson and Wisdom came into the middle of the field as part of the initial pressure phase. We definitely played more compact in the first pressure phase, both in open play and in defence of free-kicks (a trait which almost let Sunderland in to score). This shape-change helped us to win the ball back as it put players in areas that Sunderland didn’t expect. It threw their shape off and had Sunderland chasing shadows. In much the same way, Ajax would keep the ball moving and drop Litmanen into central positions to make their diamond midifield into a flat midfield, causing the opposition to reassess their own shape as they now had a new arrangement to face. The constant moving of the ball under Van Gaal was something that relied on good balance, good width, coverage of both the thirds of the field and the channels, and Van Gaal felt that a 3-4-3 did that job better than other formations, even Ajax’s historically prized 4-3-3. But it was also flexible, as have seen, and could even be changed to a 4-3-3 by dropping Rijkaard into the defense and having Blind play as a sweeper. If anyone wants to see the potential for how Rodgers wants us to play, don’t watch Barcelona – watch Ajax in the 1995 Champions League and the Eredivisie. That was the archetype of “Death by Passing”.
Conclusion – In the fullness of the game, I think we saw some real glimpses of the Rodgers vision being played out for all to see. There was no “guff”, no soundbites, no “talking”, and no buzzwords. It was Rodgers’ vision writ large for the people of Liverpool to see – extreme circulation of the ball, temporization, pressure defence, balance in all thirds and channels of the field, a central spine, and a system that every player understands, from starters to bench players. Even the addition of Allen, Suso and Carragher didn’t change the patterns of play. That, my friends, is real coaching. The players believed, the manager believes, the message is being perfected, and the addition of top quality will only see the plan getting better. For the future, I think a lot more teams are going to come to Anfield and be made to look “rubbish”. Rodgers is building a fortress, brick by brick, pass by pass. It needs some time, but it needs a good foundation, and the lumps we took early in the season in order to get the system machinated will be well worth it – if not this season, then in the seasons to come.
