This was at times a frustrating game, an exhilirating game, a tactically interesting game, and a game full of hope for the future that, as said above, really needs to be watched again to appreciate it calm in the knowledge of the result. When you look back at it know that Liverpool have won it and not having the emotion tied up with the action, you can see that we did some very, very good things, some bad things, and some things that make next season a season that can't come fast enough - the potential for where this team can go is quite exciting. It was a game that was a microcosm of so much of the season, positively and negatively, and a game that was possibly a microcosm for the future - in terms of technique, tactics and will-to-win. It is also a game that showed the intelligence of the conditioning programme that the players are now on - we looked quite fresh at the end, even Gerrard. His ability to still play 90 minutes with verve and freshness is surely one of the major triumphs of the Rodgers philosophy. But before all of that, there is the game itself.
Spurs System –Spurs played their usual 4-2-3-1/4-4-1-1 formation with a few tweaks – Dembele and Sigurdsson played more central than as out-and-out wide men, and Bale was prone to switching positions with either of them on the fly. The main attacking impetus came from Bale, of course, with Sigurdsson moving in on the blindside of the Liverpool defence on his side, and Dembele moving into any space he could find in the inside right position. Parker and Livermore held the central space and kept the attacks switching from side to side, and in fact Parker had a major influence on the Spurs possession, keeping everything tight, tidy and mobile in the middle of the field. Walker had extra attacking responsibilities due to the nature of Dembele’s positioning and movement. In terms of the Spurs attacking midfield, they were clearly playing a mobile but close-positioned game in order to overload the Liverpool central midfield. To help this, they played their usual high offside line to compress the space and keep the pressure on. This, though, had its disadvantages that Liverpool were keen to exploit:
The problem for Spurs was that Liverpool also played a tight and compact game, but played it a lot deeper than usual, and forced the Spurs midfield to alter their plan, as they were not afforded any space behind the Liverpool defence into which they could play Bale or Defoe. In fact, Defoe had a very minimal impact on the game – in a match where Spurs pressed what advantage they had and Liverpool were willing to drop deep and concede the midfield space in order to protect the defensive zone, Defoe ended up touching the ball less than Lloris at the other end of the field. Because Spurs were pushing forward to compress space into the attacking third, they left large gaps behind them – gaps that should have been exploited more effectively by Liverpool in the first 20 minutes, and which would eventually lead to Liverpool’s equalizing goal. The depth of the Liverpool defence also caused problems for Bale, because he was unable to fully utilise his pace, which is one of his two biggest assets (the other being his long-distance shooting). Because Bale relies in pace and power more (as opposed to Suarez or Coutinho who are more intricate in the their dribbling), Bale was forced out of his comfort zone, and while he was able to carry the ball into the top end of the midfield third, he was outnumbered rapidly once he tried to enter the attacking third, forcing him to change his direction of attack and preventing him from having as much of an impact as he has had in games against more open defences. Lucas, for Liverpool, did a very good job in shepherding Bale away from his strong foot, forcing him to turn and redirect his run, which lost a lot of attacking momentum for Spurs (although they did manage to open up the game a few times due to slack marking in the 3rd defender positions by Liverpool). Having said that, the two times that Bale was able to give an unhindered delivery into the box he set up both Spurs goals. On the other hand, for all the possession they had, Spurs on paper should have done a lot more. Unfortunately for them, Liverpool had a say in proceedings too.
Liverpool’s System – Liverpool lined up almost like an away team, but predictably so for anyone paying attention to the latter half of the second half of the Wigan game. Although Liverpool didn’t really go into a defensive shell until the opening goal, they hit Spurs hard and fast without sacrificing defensive solidity. This was a game that, one excellent moment aside from both Johnson and Enrique, the fullbacks didn’t commit forward as high and as often as they usually do. Liverpool were disciplined, reserved, tight in the channels (although not always tight between the lines) and had a plan to stop the main weapon of the Spurs attack in Bale. The problem that happened for Liverpool was that there essentially two segments in the team – the defensive unit (Jones, Johnson, Carragher, Agger, Enrique, Lucas, Gerrard) and the attacking unit (Coutinho, Sturridge, Suarez, Downing). Coutinho and Downing certainly dropped back to help out with defence, but a clear gap developed between the central midfield and the central attackers (Sturridge/Suarez) which meant that Sturridge became somewhat isolated after the opening goal, and Suarez was positionally unreliable in order to offer some depth to the midfield and to put pressure on Parker, forcing Gerrard to come out and do that job. It would almost have been better to play Sturridge as the shadow forward for this one game and allow Suarez the roaming target position. As it was, though, although Suarez had a great game, Sturridge was virtually invisible for much of the time he was on the field:
Downing had one of his best performances in a Liverpool jersey, capping a solid and hard-working game with a good goal. When you look at the goal again, you can see him anticipating the back pass, moving as it is played, and contesting it with Lloris, before gaining composure and smacking it in. There was debate about how he ‘should’ have placed it, but you can’t coach success. It went in, it was hit firmly, and Sturridge was possibly offside so wasn’t a passing option. However, the key players for Liverpool were the two central midfielders. The job they had to do was important, it required top effort, and it required intelligence and discipline, and Gerrard and Lucas supplied all of these qualities in abundance. Lucas did a superb job in tracking and shadowing Bale, with Agger sweeping up behind him, while Gerrard moved in his own midfield zone with menace and intent. This wasn’t a game for Gerrard to express the depth of his passing range, but to show that he could dominate an area with guile and discipline (and the few ‘straighteners’ he put into some of the Spurs players were, if not quite a new dimension to his game, certainly a reminder of the power he still possesses as a physical specimen, even if the engine is not ticking over as it used to. The “Square Base”, as Houllier once put it, held firm and did a disciplined job – in fact there were aspects of the defensive performance of the team that were very Houllier-like. On the other hand, though, we failed to get Sturridge more involved in the game, and individual errors again cost us goals. But overall, the performance was solid, encouraging, and more importantly, it was based on a tactical plan. We conceded space, rather than the concession being forced on us. Because we were willing to concede certain areas to nullify Spurs main strengths, we actually managed to control the game more. It is not unconnected that with this control, both goals for Spurs came from identical services and were scored by a central defender. In reality though, with a bit more composure, it should probably have been 2 or 3-0 before Spurs got their first. The bright spots in the attack were, of course, Coutinho, Suarez and Downing, and Coutinho in particular is showing what kind of attacking player Rodgers will look at as long as he’s here – technical, agile, quick, intelligent and adventurous. The back flick for Enrique was pure Brazil, the combination was like something from 1970, and Suarez had a touch of Jairzinho about him with his stabbed finish. Sometimes you get glimpses of the ideal vision of a manager, and that was another one for Rodgers. There will be a point in time in the near future where 90% of Liverpool goals will look like that. At that point, teams will come to Anfield already beaten.
The Goals Conceded – In a previous Round Table (Zenit), a kerfuffle was caused by me pointing out that almost all goals occur from multiple errors in succession. For some, that translated to placing blame on an individual other than the last player to touch the ball. This, of course, was not the case. The point being made by me was that we CAN’T blame individuals for the most part, because there are usually collections of players involved in goals against. But in realizing this, we can then talk more specifically about things like Leadership, and improvements to the team, etc. While that is not the direction this analysis will go in, what I think needs to be highlighted is a common thread in both goals that need to be worked on or changed – there was a certain flat-footedness in elements of both goals that made both goals predictable before the last touch was taken. For the first goal, Jones was very flat-footed and slow to get across as the cross was being taken. This meant, of course, that he was not in an optimal position as the header was being struck. He wasn’t the reason the goal was scored, but if you are watching a game in any depth, the footwork of the keeper is one of the things to look for, and his feet weren’t fast enough for the movement of the ball in the flow of play. Similarly, Johnson for the second goal was caught flat and unbalanced, and managed to fall over in a way you don’t expect professional level athletes to do. Again, he wasn’t at fault as an individual for the goal, but it was quite interesting to see a number of incidents of lack of mobility and footspeed in one game. The goals were preventable, and for sure there won’t be many other games where so much depends on players getting their feet out from under them, but it was interesting all the same that there was a clear thread for both goals based not on tactics or technique, but a physical impediment that shows the very narrow margins at the top level.
Key Factors – There were four key factors in the game (among others) that were important to the flow of play. Firstly, Gerrard and Lucas did a superb job in controlling the space right in front of the central defenders, forcing Bale to go wider with his runs, where he is less effective. His runs down the middle were stymied, and the space around Defoe was so tight he barely had a touch of the ball. This of course left some space on the wings, but I think that is probably a concession that Liverpool and Rodgers were happy with. Secondly, Suarez didn’t drop deep enough, often enough, to offer Lucas and Gerrard depth in their midfield play and to put pressure on Parker and Livermore, which meant Gerrard occasionally had to step out of position to do so. The difference was seen clearly when Allen came on the field and immediately offered that depth, which allowed Liverpool to regain some attacking control on the game. Thirdly, Johnson lost track of Sigurdsson several times, as well as losing track of Vertonghen in the two goals. The back post area is vitally important for goals in football, and having your head on a swivel as a 3rd defender is vital. It’s not the first time that this focus on the ball and not splitting his vision between the ball and the 3rd attackers has been a factor in goals against (the Evra goal for United is another example). It’s a matter of concentration, though, and it makes it seem like Johnson is a fullback who thinks like a winger rather than a defender. It is very important, though, that this gets corrected, because England is a country that is big on crosses to the back post, and failures of awareness like this get punished all too frequently. Last, but not least, was the difference in spaces between the respective midfields. Spurs were compact, tight, helped by their high defensive line, and gave a solid connection between midfield and attack and allowed them to recycle attacks and switch play. Liverpool had a noticeable gap between central midfield and the forward line, a gap that they managed okay, but which could have been better with someone other than Suarez tasked with dropping into the space. This changed with the introduction of Allen, which gave that depth, but it could have been solved by swapping Sturridge and Suarez around. The factor wasn’t, as some have said, playing 2 central midfielders against 3 in the opposition. The key factor was the lack of depth, which can come from the forwards. Cantona was excellent at this for United; Litmanen was clearly bought for this by Houllier (although very underused). We lacked it against Spurs, and it showed until Allen came on. If we are to play this way again, Rodgers will have to think about who to play up front that can offer that depth. Perhaps next season, if we play this strategy, we might see Coutinho there and someone else out wide on the left?
Overall, a good game for the neutral, a solid game from Liverpool, and a marker set down to the other teams. The benefit of this result won’t only be felt this season – indeed, a game and result like this will only galvanise the faith the players have in the manager and his methods, and will convince those (if there are any) who were on the fence. Next season, though, teams will come to Anfield knowing they will be scored on, multiple times, if they are not on their game. What will happen is they will either park the bus, meaning we will have all the possession which suits our game – or they will try to go for it, which will leave space behind which, we now know with Sturridge and Coutinho, we will exploit ruthlessly. Next season could see the return of Fortress Anfield, a major step forward in creating a title challenging team.
