Topic: World War 2

[12C]

The Americans wanted to invade Northern France as early as 1942, and were only dissuaded by British arguments of unreadiness (mainly put forward by Britain's chief of staff Alan Brooke). After Tunisia, or possibly even towards its end, the Americans wanted to invade Northern France, and were only dissuaded by British arguments of unreadiness. After this, American patience with British unwillingness to invade Northern France was running out. Summer 1944 was about as late as the Allies could invade Northern France without the US going it alone. There was always a suspicion among the Americans that they were being used to fight a British war for British interests.

The Dieppe raid put paid to the notion that a successful invasion could be mounted at that time.
Lack of air cover was crucial and the technology to get the troops off the beach was not there. The tanks never made it off the beach.
The raid was a complete failure, despite the heroism of the troops who included Canadian units as Calgary Red will know better than me, and yet when Rommel took over command of the Atlantic Wall he assessed it as inadequate to resist invasion and immediately began to strengthen its defences.

When one looks at the things that made DDay successful, it is hard to see how a successful invasion could have been achieved prior to 1944.
The Tunisia landings and the invasions of Sicily and later Italy, were a testing ground for tactics and technology.
The Salerno landings were rescued by naval bombardment by battleships, yet even then a lack of air superiority allowed German glider bombs to put Warspite out of action.
This lesson was learnt and D Day saw total air superiority as a prerequisite, in tandem with a massive bombardment by naval forces.
Mulberry and PLUTO were essential to the success. Without the supplies and especially the fuel, the invasion would have stalled within sight of the beaches.
The real chance the Wehrmacht had in preventing the success of DDay was stopping the invasion on the beaches. The airborne assaults on Pegasus bridge and the Orne canal, and the causeways behind Omaha beach  were designed to delay the German responses, and the intelligence war which planted the idea that the the real assault was at the Pas De Calais, all enabled the allies to get a secure beachhead.
Hitler dithered and Rommel was prevented from throwing his panzers at the beach head by a fractured command line.
In short, a practical invasion of Nothern France was not feasible until it happened.
As an aside ... What I never understood, was the fact that Stalin wanted US and U.K. material support and we shipped arms and materiel to Archangel that originated in the US, with appalling loss of life and ships.
To me the safer more efficient route was via the West Coast and Siberia.

Edit
Here is the Wiki link to the Dieppe Raid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid

[Sangria]

The Dieppe raid put paid to the notion that a successful invasion could be mounted at that time.
Lack of air cover was crucial and the technology to get the troops off the beach was not there. The tanks never made it off the beach.
The raid was a complete failure, despite the heroism of the troops who included Canadian units as Calgary Red will know better than me, and yet when Rommel took over command of the Atlantic Wall he assessed it as inadequate to resist invasion and immediately began to strengthen its defences.

When one looks at the things that made DDay successful, it is hard to see how a successful invasion could have been achieved prior to 1944.
The Tunisia landings and the invasions of Sicily and later Italy, were a testing ground for tactics and technology.
The Salerno landings were rescued by naval bombardment by battleships, yet even then a lack of air superiority allowed German glider bombs to put Warspite out of action.
This lesson was learnt and D Day saw total air superiority as a prerequisite, in tandem with a massive bombardment by naval forces.
Mulberry and PLUTO were essential to the success. Without the supplies and especially the fuel, the invasion would have stalled within sight of the beaches.
The real chance the Wehrmacht had in preventing the success of DDay was stopping the invasion on the beaches. The airborne assaults on Pegasus bridge and the Orne canal, and the causeways behind Omaha beach  were designed to delay the German responses, and the intelligence war which planted the idea that the the real assault was at the Pas De Calais, all enabled the allies to get a secure beachhead.
Hitler dithered and Rommel was prevented from throwing his panzers at the beach head by a fractured command line.
In short, a practical invasion of Nothern France was not feasible until it happened.
As an aside ... What I never understood, was the fact that Stalin wanted US and U.K. material support and we shipped arms and materiel to Archangel that originated in the US, with appalling loss of life and ships.
To me the safer more efficient route was via the West Coast and Siberia.

Edit
Here is the Wiki link to the Dieppe Raid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid

It's something that's often dismissed as not as worthy as military aid, but the materiel aid provided by the US and Britain hugely helped the Soviet effort, in providing technology of high standard that the transplanted industries couldn't match, in allowing them to plough resources into their own technologies, and most of all in feeding their population. At the time of Stalingrad, the Axis had access to greater resources than did the USSR (as Stalin well knew). By the summer of 1944, the Soviets were comfortable enough that they were able to bring forward their own summer offensive to draw off German resources from reinforcing Normandy.

About the Archangelsk route: wiki says that, by late in the war, the route was important more for symbolic purposes than for practical purposes, as evidence that the Allies were committed to the war effort despite not opening a second front. Probably early in the war as well, as the Russians mostly hated British weapons which they saw as inferior to their own in their conditions. The Pacific route was established but was severely affected by Japan's opening of the Pacific War. Over a quarter of LL went through Iran. I'm not sure what percentages the other routes were.

[Zeb]

Agreed. But none of that invalidates the point that Overlord was hurried along, and the subsequent advance attempted to be speeded up in order to prevent the Soviets advancing too far west through Europe once they began to drive the Nazis back westwards (or even that Churchill came round to agreeing to Overlord partly through this realisation/fear).

The historians who say this may be wrong. But it's a very credible hypothesis nonetheless that makes perfect sense.

I've not seen that suggested either, although maybe it's a very recent thing? At least not for Overlord as to imply Overlord was a result of the situation on the Eastern Front in June '44 is mad. The front in the East before Bagration was parked 300 miles east of Warsaw at Minsk. Post-Overlord, the sense wasn't so much of beating the Soviets - although the absence of support to the Warsaw Uprising in September did fuel the suspicion that Stalin was aiming for other countries rather than focusing on Germany - but that the Heer in the west had already been defeated. Which proved untrue. To contrast, Slim's push east towards the end of the war was driven on by Churchill's political aims rather than any particular military necessity. He wanted to ensure that the Japanese were seen to be defeated in the former (and, he hoped, continuing) Empire to try and head off independence movements.

[losCHUNK]

The Dieppe raid put paid to the notion that a successful invasion could be mounted at that time.
Lack of air cover was crucial and the technology to get the troops off the beach was not there. The tanks never made it off the beach.
The raid was a complete failure, despite the heroism of the troops who included Canadian units as Calgary Red will know better than me, and yet when Rommel took over command of the Atlantic Wall he assessed it as inadequate to resist invasion and immediately began to strengthen its defences.

When one looks at the things that made DDay successful, it is hard to see how a successful invasion could have been achieved prior to 1944.
The Tunisia landings and the invasions of Sicily and later Italy, were a testing ground for tactics and technology.
The Salerno landings were rescued by naval bombardment by battleships, yet even then a lack of air superiority allowed German glider bombs to put Warspite out of action.
This lesson was learnt and D Day saw total air superiority as a prerequisite, in tandem with a massive bombardment by naval forces.
Mulberry and PLUTO were essential to the success. Without the supplies and especially the fuel, the invasion would have stalled within sight of the beaches.
The real chance the Wehrmacht had in preventing the success of DDay was stopping the invasion on the beaches. The airborne assaults on Pegasus bridge and the Orne canal, and the causeways behind Omaha beach  were designed to delay the German responses, and the intelligence war which planted the idea that the the real assault was at the Pas De Calais, all enabled the allies to get a secure beachhead.
Hitler dithered and Rommel was prevented from throwing his panzers at the beach head by a fractured command line.
In short, a practical invasion of Nothern France was not feasible until it happened.
As an aside ... What I never understood, was the fact that Stalin wanted US and U.K. material support and we shipped arms and materiel to Archangel that originated in the US, with appalling loss of life and ships.
To me the safer more efficient route was via the West Coast and Siberia.

Edit
Here is the Wiki link to the Dieppe Raid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid

Agree with this, I think it's worth mentioning n all that Churchill's experience with Gallipoli would've been a reminder of how bad an amphibious assault can go without the support it needed. 
It's extremely difficult for me to see how the Americans could've done it alone even in 44, with the difficulties on both their beaches (1 being almost abandoned) and stretching their resources over the remaining 3 beaches, the German war machine still had a nasty bite even in 44.  The Americans being green were badly mauled in Tunisia so everybody must've known that launching an operation directly after that would've been a risk not worth taking, fully supplied and with air superiority the Axis actually had the upper hand in that campaign despite being outnumbered. 

Despite the success of D-day the majority of ports was still in German control for a long time, the lessons learnt in Tunisia and Sicily helped the Allies refine their plan on how to logistically supply a rapid advance off the beach heads and through France, without that experience there's every chance the advance could've slowed and pushed back much like Rommel in Africa.  Likewise, if the Germans took the same lessons from Africa and applied them to Barbarossa the world could look like a very different place.

[Indomitable_Carp]

The Dieppe raid put paid to the notion that a successful invasion could be mounted at that time.
Lack of air cover was crucial and the technology to get the troops off the beach was not there. The tanks never made it off the beach.
The raid was a complete failure, despite the heroism of the troops who included Canadian units as Calgary Red will know better than me, and yet when Rommel took over command of the Atlantic Wall he assessed it as inadequate to resist invasion and immediately began to strengthen its defences.

When one looks at the things that made DDay successful, it is hard to see how a successful invasion could have been achieved prior to 1944.
The Tunisia landings and the invasions of Sicily and later Italy, were a testing ground for tactics and technology.
The Salerno landings were rescued by naval bombardment by battleships, yet even then a lack of air superiority allowed German glider bombs to put Warspite out of action.
This lesson was learnt and D Day saw total air superiority as a prerequisite, in tandem with a massive bombardment by naval forces.
Mulberry and PLUTO were essential to the success. Without the supplies and especially the fuel, the invasion would have stalled within sight of the beaches.
The real chance the Wehrmacht had in preventing the success of DDay was stopping the invasion on the beaches. The airborne assaults on Pegasus bridge and the Orne canal, and the causeways behind Omaha beach  were designed to delay the German responses, and the intelligence war which planted the idea that the the real assault was at the Pas De Calais, all enabled the allies to get a secure beachhead.
Hitler dithered and Rommel was prevented from throwing his panzers at the beach head by a fractured command line.
In short, a practical invasion of Nothern France was not feasible until it happened.
As an aside ... What I never understood, was the fact that Stalin wanted US and U.K. material support and we shipped arms and materiel to Archangel that originated in the US, with appalling loss of life and ships.
To me the safer more efficient route was via the West Coast and Siberia.

Edit
Here is the Wiki link to the Dieppe Raid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid

I thought this was fairly well established historiography. I was always under the impression that D-Day was pushed back until it was felt that the situation in Europe, and the demands of the advancing Soviets to ease pressure, forced the issue in the Summer of ´44.

By the time of Operation Overlord there were about 1.6 million American servicemen in Britain ready to support the liberation of France.

This compares to about 100,000 US personnel who were originally diverted to Operation Torch in November ´42, roughly 200,000 for Sicily in July ´43, and roughly 600,000 in Italy by the time of Overlord.

And that is just personnel, not even mentioning material. It does not include all the other preparation work that went into Overlord to make it a success. Combined with the fact that it wasn´t until Kursk in the Summer of ´43 that the German was definitively on the run in the East - which made reinforcing the defence of an invasion into France that much more difficult.

As a side note, my Grandfathers uncle was on the Arctic Convoys you mention as a Merchant Seaman.

[Riquende]

A thread called "World War 2" suddenly pops up in Current Affairs...

And I wondered if this was a sudden continuation of hostilities or just the most epic thread necromancy of all time.

[Yorkykopite]

A thread called "World War 2" suddenly pops up in Current Affairs...

And I wondered if this was a sudden continuation of hostilities or just the most epic thread necromancy of all time.

The argument was split from the Trump thread. It was originally the familiar one about how the United States has no moral standing in the world and is the source of most of the world's evil (I exaggerate, but only slightly). Someone posted the extraordinary thesis that America (and Britain) rushed into D-Day in 1944 not to defeat the Germans, but to defeat the Soviets instead. Jaws dropped in wonder. There were a few responses and then John C - quite sensibly - split the discussion into a separate thread.

[Yorkykopite]

As a side note, my Grandfathers uncle was on the Arctic Convoys you mention as a Merchant Seaman.

From a British point of view I can't think of a worst posting than that. Unbelievable heroism.

(Although Nobby will be here in a moment to explain how our provisioning of the Soviet Union was really a nasty little trick to.........I don't know.....I'll let him fill in the details!)

[Red-Soldier]

A thread called "World War 2" suddenly pops up in Current Affairs...

And I wondered if this was a sudden continuation of hostilities or just the most epic thread necromancy of all time.

Basically, there was a collective of posters derailing the Trump thread, flogging a few dead horses in the process.

[Yorkykopite]

Basically, there was a collective of posters derailing the Trump thread, flogging a few dead horses in the process.

I'd never seen the horse that Nobby was riding before - dead or alive.

[Wabaloolah]

All I'll say on the WW2 aspect is that I've seen a few Americans who talk about saving our ass during the war.  They didn't save our ass.  We saved our own ass.  We paid them a lot of money for the resources to do it, and then they helped us save Europe's ass.  They took the brunt of that fight, and in the Pacific, but in the land battles of Africa, Asia and Europe we did our part. They profited quite handsomely from the whole endeavour.

Americans are good fighters and sturdy allies, but regular Americans are prone to simplistic thinking when it comes to the war.  Hell I only just came across a video outlining how Britain worked hard to smash the international slave trade to bits for the best part of a century, when American was fighting a civil war over it, so there's plenty of stuff even I don't know.

If Britain had gone under in 1940 the war in Europe would have been far more difficult for the US to enter, they would not have had a base to rain air raids upon Germany and D-Day quite simply would not have happened.  We may then have had Russia ruling the whole of Europe rather than the Eastern Bloc.


Britain and Churchill's role in resisting the Nazi's was as key as any role that the US played in assisting with the liberation of Europe.  Both are vitally important and one would most likely not have happened without the other

[Qston]

Agreed. But none of that invalidates the point that Overlord was hurried along, and the subsequent advance attempted to be speeded up in order to prevent the Soviets advancing too far west through Europe once they began to drive the Nazis back westwards (or even that Churchill came round to agreeing to Overlord partly through this realisation/fear).

The historians who say this may be wrong. But it's a very credible hypothesis nonetheless that makes perfect sense.

I have read this thread with real interest. If I have a 'subject' this is it. The above hypothesis is not correct. Yes, in part there was a realisation that the soviets were moving quickly but that didn`t precipitate a 'hurried' along D Day. Other posters are quite correct. Stalin was pushing for a second front for quite some time prior to 1944. There was tension between Britain and the USA on timings and it was ultimately accepted by the USA that there was a need to fight the germans somewhere, hence operation torch which was then followed, when conditions allowed, for the invasion of Sicily and then mainland Italy. Churchill's so called 'soft belly'. The fighting in North Africa taught the USA a lesson that the British already understood - that the German army was formidable. The soviets were not appeased by these landings and did not consider them a proper 'second front'.

Churchill, the war cabinet and the British high command were also heavily scarred by the horrors if WW1 and this played a part in their thinking (not unreasonably). Right up until D Day itself Churchill wasn`t 'anti' as such, and ultimately accepted it had to happen, but probably quite rightly wanted the conditions as perfect as they could be. There was also very heavy competing interests on landing craft with an ongoing tension on the operations in Italy and with the Pacific theatre. Whilst military output was incredible there were still finite limits. Those limits also played a part in the delay of D Day from 1943, and the then ongoing operations elsewhere.

The original plans and timings for D Day and the ensuing operations envisaged a quicker breakout but the British and Canadians became bogged down at Caen and it took several months to break the back of German resistance. The plans weren`t part of any 'race' and need to meet the Soviets further east in political terms.

The politics of it developed late in 1944 and early 1945 when military commanders on the ground actually wanted to race to Berlin but were stopped by Eisenhower and others in high command. Eisenhower wanted a fully prepared and readied move across the Rhine and wasn`t prepared to let Patton off the leash. The crossing of the Rhine didn`t happen until March 1945 (Operation Plunder). This is where I think any argument that the whole venture was rushed because of political influence falls down. In the main, Eisenhower had full command of what happened in Europe and had learned lessons in diplomacy from operation torch when having to balance all the competing interests - particularly the french. He applied what he learned in western europe in managing particularly Montgomery and Patton but also the overall politics of the situation.

Anyway, I don`t want to prattle on but in short any idea that D Day was speeded up due to prevent the soviets moving further west is imho a complete misrepresentation of what happened.

[Nobby Reserve]

The argument was split from the Trump thread. It was originally the familiar one about how the United States has no moral standing in the world and is the source of most of the world's evil (I exaggerate, but only slightly). Someone posted the extraordinary thesis that America (and Britain) rushed into D-Day in 1944 not to defeat the Germans, but to defeat the Soviets instead. Jaws dropped in wonder. There were a few responses and then John C - quite sensibly - split the discussion into a separate thread.

And then somebody posted a gross misrepresentation of what another poster had said.

 

I said I'd seen, in a documentary some time ago, a historian say that D-Day and the subsequent push eastwards, was hurried along partly through fear of the Soviets pushing through westwards across Europe potentially as far as France, and that I'd heard this broad hypothesis aired subsequently.

I never once mentioned the aim of D-Day was to defeat the Soviets instead of Germany; that's just your fevered paranoia (the same paranoia that had you infer I would have preferred the Soviets to have annexed Europe), although in response I did clarify that I agreed with any aim by the US/UK to keep the Soviet advance held in check (and Churchill was widely quoted - albeit after D-Day - saying that he "wanted to shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as possible".)

Got to say I'm taken aback at the ferocity of the responses generally to what was just a claim made by a historian, one that I felt made sense from a strategic perspective. If it's not true, then it's no skin off my nose.

[Qston]

And then somebody posted a gross misrepresentation of what another poster had said.

 

I said I'd seen, in a documentary some time ago, a historian say that D-Day and the subsequent push eastwards, was hurried along partly through fear of the Soviets pushing through westwards across Europe potentially as far as France, and that I'd heard this broad hypothesis aired subsequently.

I never once mentioned the aim of D-Day was to defeat the Soviets instead of Germany; that's just your fevered paranoia (the same paranoia that had you infer I would have preferred the Soviets to have annexed Europe), although in response I did clarify that I agreed with any aim by the US/UK to keep the Soviet advance held in check (and Churchill was widely quoted - albeit after D-Day - saying that he "wanted to shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as possible".)

Got to say I'm taken aback at the ferocity of the responses generally to what was just a claim made by a historian, one that I felt made sense from a strategic perspective. If it's not true, then it's no skin off my nose.

Like with any developing situation there are shades of grey and yes, latterly in the war there was more of a sense of urgency in moving east but that wasn`t the initial aim of D Day and it wasn`t really an issue until it could be an issue - if that makes sense. It certainly didn`t influence the military commanders until towards the very end. Churchill always detested Stalin and everything he stood for. He was one of the first to warn the USA about the impending soviet threat as we all know (Iron Curtain). The west was also well aware of what the soviets (Stalin) were capable of but also acutely aware that in sheer loss the Russians really did take the brunt of german ferocity.

Anyway, it is an interesting debate mate and discussing a hypothesis like this will have different views.

[Sangria]

And then somebody posted a gross misrepresentation of what another poster had said.

 

I said I'd seen, in a documentary some time ago, a historian say that D-Day and the subsequent push eastwards, was hurried along partly through fear of the Soviets pushing through westwards across Europe potentially as far as France, and that I'd heard this broad hypothesis aired subsequently.

I never once mentioned the aim of D-Day was to defeat the Soviets instead of Germany; that's just your fevered paranoia (the same paranoia that had you infer I would have preferred the Soviets to have annexed Europe), although in response I did clarify that I agreed with any aim by the US/UK to keep the Soviet advance held in check (and Churchill was widely quoted - albeit after D-Day - saying that he "wanted to shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as possible".)

Got to say I'm taken aback at the ferocity of the responses generally to what was just a claim made by a historian, one that I felt made sense from a strategic perspective. If it's not true, then it's no skin off my nose.

Any idea who the historian was?

[Nobby Reserve]

Any idea who the historian was?

No, sorry. It wasn't like the basis of a documentary or anything. I just remember a remark stating this and it got me thinking, then having a 'wow, that adds up!' moment.

[Lusty]

Any idea who the historian was?

For what it's worth, I'm sure I've heard the same thing said through some documentary or podcast or whatever.  Not saying I agree with it (and neither is Nobby I think) but the fact both of us have come across it before suggests that it was at least an opinion that cut through to the mainstream and that the response in here has been a bit extreme.

[Nobby Reserve]

Like with any developing situation there are shades of grey and yes, latterly in the war there was more of a sense of urgency in moving east but that wasn`t the initial aim of D Day and it wasn`t really an issue until it could be an issue - if that makes sense. It certainly didn`t influence the military commanders until towards the very end. Churchill always detested Stalin and everything he stood for. He was one of the first to warn the USA about the impending soviet threat as we all know (Iron Curtain). The west was also well aware of what the soviets (Stalin) were capable of but also acutely aware that in sheer loss the Russians really did take the brunt of german ferocity.

Anyway, it is an interesting debate mate and discussing a hypothesis like this will have different views.

Thanks for your post. I was feeling a little beleaguered there

When we went to France in the summer, we ferried into and out of Ouistreham. On the return crossing, I was at the back of the ferry looking at the actual Sword Beach, which seemed amazing. We were on a tight schedule, or I'd have loved to have spent a couple hours walking along it, visiting the memorials and spotting remnants of the time.

[Indomitable_Carp]

Thanks for your post. I was feeling a little beleaguered there

When we went to France in the summer, we ferried into and out of Ouistreham. On the return crossing, I was at the back of the ferry looking at the actual Sword Beach, which seemed amazing. We were on a tight schedule, or I'd have loved to have spent a couple hours walking along it, visiting the memorials and spotting remnants of the time.

I don´t think the initial claim is that out of sorts with what everyone else has been saying.

As Qston said, while D-Day was planned around what was considered achievable with maximum chance of success with the focus being on bringing down the Nazi´s, it is hardly a stretch to think the fast encroaching juggernaut of the Red Army had a role in the strategic decision making.

I was always under the impression that Overlord and the subsequent Allied liberation of Western Europe was very much done with one eye on the USSR. The war in the East was absolutely pivotal, and I think it is fair to say that nearly every decision taken against the Nazi´s in Western Europe was done with the outcome of the Eastern Front at least partly in mind. Nor do I think that takes away anything from what the Western Allies achieved.

From a British point of view I can't think of a worst posting than that. Unbelievable heroism.

It sounds horrendous. Although actually while he survived my Great Great Grandad wasn´t so lucky. He was blown up in the Bristol Channel by a seamine, with I think most other hands on deck.

His son (my Great Grandad), was sunk twice in the Atlantic and survived both times. And another one of my Grandad´s uncles was lucky enough to survive the Laconia incident which killed more people then the Titanic (there was actually a BBC dramatisation on it a few years back) and spent the remainder of his war in a POW camp before being liberated by the Americans.

Pure chance at the end of the day!

[Yorkykopite]

No, sorry. It wasn't like the basis of a documentary or anything. I just remember a remark stating this and it got me thinking, then having a 'wow, that adds up!' moment.

Any reference at all to support this idea (from a reputable historian)?

[Trump's tiny tiny hands]

For what it's worth, I'm sure I've heard the same thing said through some documentary or podcast or whatever.  Not saying I agree with it (and neither is Nobby I think) but the fact both of us have come across it before suggests that it was at least an opinion that cut through to the mainstream and that the response in here has been a bit extreme.

Yeah me too. Maybe something on the colourised series "Great Battles" or the Smithonian Channel

[Qston]

Thanks for your post. I was feeling a little beleaguered there

When we went to France in the summer, we ferried into and out of Ouistreham. On the return crossing, I was at the back of the ferry looking at the actual Sword Beach, which seemed amazing. We were on a tight schedule, or I'd have loved to have spent a couple hours walking along it, visiting the memorials and spotting remnants of the time.

It's well worth doing. I have been to some of the landing beaches and also various battle sites and memorials throughout France. The most sobering of them was probably Oradour Sur Glane which has been left as a permanent memorial from the day the germans arrived and annihilated almost the entire village in revenge for local resistance. They haven`t touched anything so the cars are still in the street, the buildings as they were (although derelict due to ageing) and signs, tram rails and so on. I finally shed a little tear (and I am not an emotional fella) when I went into the church, which is where the women and children were gathered, and there is a little dolls pram left from that day and there are bullet holes all around the church. It is certainly an eerie place but certainly worth the visit if you are ever in that region.

Anyway, I certainly recommend visiting some of these sites mate if you are interested. It is a fascinating period of history and I know so many people are interested and know an awful lot about it, but that is in part because all of us probably have family members who fought and sacrificed at home, at sea, on the continent and also in asia. My family were involved all over the world and I have had an interest ever since I was little as a result. They made a film about one of them 

Anyway, apologies for meandering again

[ljycb]

Any suggestions on good books to start off with on the Second World War?

[Sangria]

Any suggestions on good books to start off with on the Second World War?

The Cornelius Ryan books (Longest Day, Last Battle, Bridge Too Far) are supposed to be pioneers in quality narrative histories of the respective battles (D-Day, Berlin, Market Garden). Antony Beevor is fairly well regarded, as is Max Hastings. Hugh Ambrose's The Pacific is as good a narrative account of the Pacific campaign as you'll get among mainstream histories. I'd start with those until you've picked out more specific areas that you want more detail in.

[ljycb]

The Cornelius Ryan books (Longest Day, Last Battle, Bridge Too Far) are supposed to be pioneers in quality narrative histories of the respective battles (D-Day, Berlin, Market Garden). Antony Beevor is fairly well regarded, as is Max Hastings. Hugh Ambrose's The Pacific is as good a narrative account of the Pacific campaign as you'll get among mainstream histories. I'd start with those until you've picked out more specific areas that you want more detail in.

Thanks, Sangria. I will have a look into them.

[Qston]

The Cornelius Ryan books (Longest Day, Last Battle, Bridge Too Far) are supposed to be pioneers in quality narrative histories of the respective battles (D-Day, Berlin, Market Garden). Antony Beevor is fairly well regarded, as is Max Hastings. Hugh Ambrose's The Pacific is as good a narrative account of the Pacific campaign as you'll get among mainstream histories. I'd start with those until you've picked out more specific areas that you want more detail in.

I agree with this. Anything by Max Hastings on WW2 is worthwhile reading, particularly "Armageddon". The most definitive though is Antony Beevors "The Second World War". Brilliant book.

[ljycb]

I agree with this. Anything by Max Hastings on WW2 is worthwhile reading, particularly "Armageddon". The most definitive though is Antony Beevors "The Second World War". Brilliant book.

Thanks, Qston. I’ll start with Beevors if you’re saying it’s the most definitive.

[Qston]

Thanks, Qston. I’ll start with Beevors if you’re saying it’s the most definitive.

Well if you want anymore recommendations after ploughing through that, or have a particular aspect of it you want to read into then just give me a shout mate. My house is full of history books - the Mrs goes on at me all the time !

[Sammy5IsAlive]

Any suggestions on good books to start off with on the Second World War?

In terms of the Eastern Front Alan Clark's Barbarossa is very good. I'd also recommend The Retreat by Michael Jones which covers the failure of the German offensive on Moscow in winter 1941 and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensive but takes a more human level approach with lots of primary material from the soldiers involved.

More of a memoir than a history book but I'd also highly recommend The Big Show by Pierre Clostermann who was a French Spitfire/Typhoon pilot with the RAF.

[Yorkykopite]

In terms of the Eastern Front Alan Clark's Barbarossa is very good.

That's a good recommendation. KS Karol's memoir 'Solik', whose main chapters are about fighting in the Red Army in the war, is mind blowing. Norman Lewis, 'Naples 1944' is justly revered.

[Zeb]

I'd recommend Ryan's Longest Day still as an introduction to WW2 history. After that it's really what you're interested in. Toll is good on the war in the Pacific. Beevor and Glantz both have started on covering parts of the Eastern Front. I was coming at it more from the economic side so work of likes of Tooze is kind of the high point in changing the discussions being had. As important in its way as Frieser's Blitzkrieg Legend in examining the fall of France in 1940 in building on evidence and interpretations built up over many years. edit: and talking of Frieser, DRZW is fantastic if you can get hold of the English translations as it gives a very thorough and considered insight as the official German history of the war albeit done over the decades since.

[Sangria]

In terms of the Eastern Front Alan Clark's Barbarossa is very good. I'd also recommend The Retreat by Michael Jones which covers the failure of the German offensive on Moscow in winter 1941 and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensive but takes a more human level approach with lots of primary material from the soldiers involved.

More of a memoir than a history book but I'd also highly recommend The Big Show by Pierre Clostermann who was a French Spitfire/Typhoon pilot with the RAF.

Clark's Barbarossa is rather superseded by more recent research. Beevor's Stalingrad and Berlin: The Downfall are better popular histories. For an overview of the Great Patriotic War, Richard Overy's Russia's War is probably the best English language narrative history. Both Beevor and Overy correct some of the myths perpetuated in Clark's history; not Clark's fault, as he didn't have access to Soviet archives at the time he wrote it.

[TepidT2O]

Janes Holland does some very good ones too...

[Sangria]

I'd recommend Ryan's Longest Day still as an introduction to WW2 history. After that it's really what you're interested in. Toll is good on the war in the Pacific. Beevor and Glantz both have started on covering parts of the Eastern Front. I was coming at it more from the economic side so work of likes of Tooze is kind of the high point in changing the discussions being had. As important in its way as Frieser's Blitzkrieg Legend in examining the fall of France in 1940 in building on evidence and interpretations built up over many years. edit: and talking of Frieser, DRZW is fantastic if you can get hold of the English translations as it gives a very thorough and considered insight as the official German history of the war albeit done over the decades since.

If you're up to reading Glantz, you don't really need Beevor, assuming you can afford his books. The most reliable English language historians on the Eastern Front are mostly building on Glantz, who is the definitive English language source on Soviet records (at least until the Russians banned him from their archives for being less than complimentary about Zhukov in Operation Mars).

[Zeb]

If you're up to reading Glantz, you don't really need Beevor, assuming you can afford his books. The most reliable English language historians on the Eastern Front are mostly building on Glantz, who is the definitive English language source on Soviet records (at least until the Russians banned him from their archives for being less than complimentary about Zhukov in Operation Mars).

Beevor's nice for when Glantz gets too dry and wrapped up in quoting operational orders. It's a different focus and style rather than it being either/or.

[Yorkykopite]

Clark's Barbarossa is rather superseded by more recent research. Beevor's Stalingrad and Berlin: The Downfall are better popular histories. For an overview of the Great Patriotic War, Richard Overy's Russia's War is probably the best English language narrative history. Both Beevor and Overy correct some of the myths perpetuated in Clark's history; not Clark's fault, as he didn't have access to Soviet archives at the time he wrote it.

I love Alan Clark's myths  'The Donkeys' (about WW1) has more than its fair share too. But there's an essential truth there nonetheless.

I hated him when he played against us though. Constant danger in the box.

[Nobby Reserve]

There's also some amazing TV documentary series. They don't delve as deep into detail, but as an overview of specific arenas, they are brilliant.

The Adolf Hitler's War series on Yesterday is good.

The scope of the War was so great that there's still snippets of info that is totally new to me.

[Sangria]

I love Alan Clark's myths  'The Donkeys' (about WW1) has more than its fair share too. But there's an essential truth there nonetheless.

I hated him when he played against us though. Constant danger in the box.

As an antidote to The Donkeys myth, I recommend John Terraine, and in a drier but informative form, Paddy Griffith. The British command, on the whole, couldn't have been substantially any better than they were, and the main tenets of the Donkeys myth were mostly unfair. Eg. the whole generals in their chateaux myth, when Haig specified that commanders were to be as close to the front line as they practically could whilst still exercising command, with only divisional commanders and above being beyond enemy artillery range.

Lloyd George criticised Haig for as long as he'd held office, until Haig lost patience and offered to step down for Lloyd George's replacement of choice. Given his lead at last, Lloyd George looked through every conceivable option, and found none better, and grudgingly backed Haig (although he imposed a chief of staff who was ostensibly loyal to Lloyd George). There's a reason why the French revered Haig, and Hitler hated him.

[Sangria]

Beevor's nice for when Glantz gets too dry and wrapped up in quoting operational orders. It's a different focus and style rather than it being either/or.

That's why I specified if you're up to reading Glantz. I'm not, which is why I rely on other historians' summaries of his work. I really don't recommend Glantz unless you've finished Beevor, Overy and so on and still hanker for more detail. That said, I once read Erickson, so I've gone through dry histories before (although I don't remember a single bit of his volumes).

[Sangria]

There's also some amazing TV documentary series. They don't delve as deep into detail, but as an overview of specific arenas, they are brilliant.

The Adolf Hitler's War series on Yesterday is good.

The scope of the War was so great that there's still snippets of info that is totally new to me.

Russia's War was the best English language TV documentary series on the Eastern Front at the time it came out. I don't know if it still is, but it's certainly worth watching.