Interesting update from Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group:
for the last 40 years, one of the west’s most widely-held (and yet thoroughly untested) presumptions was that china would need to politically reform as it transitioned to a middle income country... or else it would fail. xi jinping's decision to change the country's constitution—in place since 1982—thereby opening the way for him to become the country's president for life should definitively put to rest that notion. xi has sidelined all major domestic opposition (or worse); the country's economic, political, foreign policy, and ideological priorities are now firmly aligned with the chinese president (there's really no alternative vision or worldview among chinese leadership today); and there's a clear path of political stability going forward.
a few implications:
1. the chinese people's daily was unusually defensive in reporting the move, explaining how the decision was necessary to harmonize with the communist party constitution (where there are no such term limits on the general secretary), and explicitly saying the change doesn't necessarily mean that xi jinping is president for life. the chinese state media rarely feels the need to justify itself; there was clearly significant/high-level internal pushback as a result of the move.
2. xi jinping's willingness to take major risks is increasing with his power. there's been a presumption in the western press that the chinese president is an incrementalist; but while he's one of the most strategic/long-term thinkers among the world's leaders today, xi has also shown a willingness to make bold and sudden moves when the opportunities present themselves. that was the case with broad shakeup of the central military commission in the run-up to the 19th party congress (in response to rumors of disloyalty at the top); it's true of what's been an expanding anti-corruption campaign; and it's clearly true of the decision to extend his rule.
3. the united states (and the west more broadly) will now face a more challenging negotiating environment. westerners that hoped for closer partnership with beijing have been able to build connections with reform-oriented chinese of various stripes: technocrats in the finance ministry, private sector entrepreneurs, journalists, former diplomats in the think tank community. the intention was that they would be able to work within the system to promote policies that eventually aligned their government more closely with a western-led international system. that strategy is far less likely to bear fruit now; both in terms of the comparative "independence" of would be chinese reformers, as well as their ability to influence what will become a much more top-down political process.
4. china will become a more closed political system. before xi's accession to the presidency, china had incrementally (albeit very slowly) opened up politically over the past 20 years. chinese entrepreneurs and intellectuals in particular had felt greater operating room. that was already open to growing doubt over the past years—corporations were reporting internal communist cells organizing and expanding to create new sets of workplace communications networks and policies inside their companies; western textbooks were becoming more uncommon in chinese classrooms. now western corporations will face more external constraints, especially with regard to domestic political priorities; media will face more scrutiny and censorship (formal and self-imposed); educational processes will be more tightly controlled.
5. chinese economic reform faces uncertainty. wang qishan and liu he, xi's critical managers of the chinese economy, have been strengthened by this governance change. but they're best seen as loyal and capable technocrats rather than reformers (and certainly not western reformers; "reform" in chinese parlance can mean liberalization but it can also mean increasing efficiency through more top-down control and the determination of strategic initiatives and sectors. much chinese economic "reform" as perceived by the west is presently stalled (financial sector reform, currency reform) or even backtracking (state owned enterprise reform; it sector reform and data regulations).
6. longer-term partnerships will become more challenging, but also more predictable. the rules of the road will shift more in favor of chinese champions, but with consolidation of power under xi, patronage networks will become more stratified and regularized. major state owned corporations, banks, governors and ministers from preferred provinces (as prioritized through the belt and road initiative) will become entrenched for the long term, as opposed to the in-fighting and ups and downs experienced by those in political favor under previous regimes.
for china's future, the notion of xi for life is a decidedly mixed blessing. china can now more easily continue long-term projects, including the development of long-term economic and technology strategy that will solidify beijing as a force for transformational change. it's a spur for growth and investment, and improves the trajectory of china's near-to-medium term global influence. china will become a clearer alternative to the us-led political and economic models of governance (irrespective of who is president post-trump), and will strengthen bilateral relationships with a broader group of countries around the world accordingly, while also antagonizing those whose values, economic systems, and security relationships are too misaligned to welcome a beijing umbrella.
but longer term, a far more uncertain eventual succession creates obvious risk. the personalization of power networks weakens the resilience of the chinese communist party and china's government institutions. that's a particular risk in the case of a sudden illness or xi's demise; but even with a more "managed" long-term transition (a la nazarbayev's kazakhstan, for example), it's a bigger challenge. the biggest question mark around authoritarian regimes remains sharp instability around sudden transitions; perhaps even more than china's economic miracle, the managing of the leadership succession process is arguably the greatest success of the world's most important authoritarian regime. that's now an open question.
