It's this conclusion I cannot quite get my head around. It sounds reasonable and even unarguable. But perhaps it dodges a difficult question. For example what would happen in a "supreme emergency" (as Michael Walzer in his great book 'Just and Unjust Wars' termed it)? What if we were threatened with a sudden attack, or simply attacked? What if another Rwanda came along and all of a sudden there were a million people vulnerable to the genocidaires?
Is Chilcot saying that feasibility studies and post-conflict plans should be drawn up before any action was taken? Would there be time?
Good points.
The Chilcott report is a good one, and provides historical accuracy.
The emotion from the bereaved service families is understandable, but their loved ones knew the deal when they signed up, you can be killed doing your job. The hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians had no such choice.
Blair, like pretty much every post war British Prime Minister, was star struck by an American President and the idea that he could be part of a process involving the most powerful country in the world.
I do believe he genuinely thought that deposing Saddam was the right thing to do, and that Saddam had the potential to use, or supply, WMD. He was wrong, the French and UN were right.
Blair was a political animal, but not a wartime strategist. He failed in both areas in Iraq.
Cameron in Libya and Syria has demonstrated that the lessons of Iraq have not been learned, namely that an evil bastard in charge is easier to deal with than a country of evil bastards where no-one is in charge.
Contemporary lessons? Corbyn, for all his anti- Blair glee, may wish to reflect that simply saying “I’m in charge” is not enough. The Leavers may wish to reflect that turning our back on Europe and embracing the United States is not smart.