Topic: Counter- or Gegenpressing

[kaz1983]

Gegenpressing has been a buzzword in football tactics for the last five years and has garnered more and more attention in the media recently. Because of the success of FC Barcelona and Borussia Dortmund, gegen- or counterpressing has been brought up as one of the main reasons for their titles. BVB, in particular, is defined by their style. However, the media often shows a lack of understanding as to what counterpressing really is.

What is Gegenpressing?


Gegenpressing means to press the opposition right after losing possession, i.e. to press as an organized unit the moment you transition to defense. The entire team hunts the ball and, in the ideal case, immediately wins it back from the opponent. The aim is twofold; to prevent the opponent’s counterattack and to win the ball. The English, and even the Spanish and Italians, call it counterpressing and not “Gegenpressing”; in the end the opponent’s counterattack is pressured. In 2008, Jürgen Klinsmann spoke of “immediate ball recovery” and struck at the heart of the matter very well.

How does one use Gegenpressing successfully?

There are several prerequisites for successful counterpressing. The decisive factor is the overall positioning of the team and their playing style right before attempting to counterpress. The players must play as close to one another as possible so that they can press together as a unit right after the ball is lost – which is a given in short passing football. At the same time, they should not stick so close to one another that they neglect to cover enough space. Usually, a good layout in possession and a good shape behind the lost ball go hand in hand.

Some trainers use the basic rule of thumb to “occupy the fewest possible zones with individual players, but the greatest possible distance between the players within those zones so that they don’t occupy the same space” to make the positioning simple to understand; although, with a rule of thumb like this, some aspects are lost in terms of complexity.



Many teams also have problems deciding when to stop pressing, i.e. when do you stop pressing if you can’t win the ball back? When should you retreat? How long should you press and with how many players? This is particularly problematic because the position of the ball is always changing. Therefore, there is a commonly used theory – the five second rule. Immediately after losing the ball the team should press at top speed and with maximum intensity for five seconds.

If the team hasn’t recovered the ball within five seconds and there is no chance of immediately winning it, they should fall back into their defensive formation. Depending on the team, the number of seconds may vary. It is recommended that the strategic basics of Gegenpressing be coached in order to develop a flexible, situation-specific length of time for counterpressing.

It is also important that the team respond very quickly and with anticipation. When possession changes, the players should already be running; next, it is important for the motor response and cognitive reaction to accurately match the manner of the opponent winning the ball and the situation and the anticipation of the possession change. The player must always expect that possession could come, but at the same time assign to the situation a certain percentage and behave accordingly. The observation of the situation and the shape is important.

Tactical aspects to consider

There are a few aspects which should be implemented for an accurate Gegenpressing. Blocking the center of the field is important for a successful implementation. In the middle of the field, the opponent has more options when it comes to rotation, field of vision, and passing. Even if a player arcs their run to block one side of the field, the opponent will have the other entire half of the field to work with. Ideally, the opponent who recovers the ball will be forced in the direction of the touchline or back towards his own goal and away from the center of the field. There, he will have no opportunity to rotate and his choices will be limited, which will also rob him of the most effective and quickest path towards goal, as any counterattack will take longer.

Ideally, the opponent will be surrounded from the center out, forcing him to play backwards or square passes and thus isolating him from his teammates. This naturally raises the question of who ultimately won the ball. Some teams only try to cut off the opponent on the ball and attack him passively. Which is good, as one will not be outplayed and the nearest presser has a chance to recover the ball. But, at the same time, the opponents can move freely, slow the game down, and generate more options for themselves.

Another option is to run directly at the ball carrier; the opponent is simply pressed aggressively as possible, one does not slow down first or establish the ominous “basketball distance” when challenging for the ball. As a result, the opponent has less time, the pace is quicker, and you can attack more aggressively. At the same time, you will lose the challenge more often, be outplayed or commit fouls.

A final method is to deliberately run past the opponent. The opponent will not be slowed down, but the first counterpressing player has no intention of winning the ball. He should merely hand off the opponent and retain his own original position in the cover shadow. As a result, the tempo here is extremely quick and the opponent will be forced into a specific action to which the pressing team can more easily react. The next player attacks and can then win the ball easier. An interesting side note: after the ball is recovered, you can immediately play a clear pass to the player who has run past the opponent. “Clear” here means that the distance is suitable, space is gained, and the teammate knows from the previous situation that he is in front of an opponent.

What are the coverage variants?

There are basically four counterpressing variants for the various coverages.

In man-oriented Gegenpressing, one looks for an opponent to cover immediately after his team loses the ball. A player runs up, cuts off the opponent,and forces him into a follow-up action. Usually a pass comes to a player and only after the pass does the ball recovery occur. All nearby passing options should be put under immediate pressure, so that the opponent cannot get free and escape the pressure. FC Bayern practiced this style under Jupp Heynckes.



Another option is leeway-oriented counterpressing. Here, there is relatively little consideration for the opponent. Instead, one focuses on the ball carrier, the ball itself, and the surrounding area. The entire team presses in the direction of the ball and seeks to generate the greatest possible pressure. This pressure should force errors, enable the team to cover and support the first pressing player, and simultaneously absorb the nearby passing options in their cover shadow. This intense pressure often causes the opponent to immediately lose the ball or kick it long. BVB have used this style under Jürgen Klopp.



In passing lane-oriented counterpressing the opponent will also be placed under pressure by a player, but here, as in the man-oriented version, the opponent is allowed to make the first pass. In contrast to the man-oriented counterpressing, however, the pass receiver is not attacked, but the pass itself. The aim is to set up between some opponents and then, after the ball is passed, to flexibly recover the ball, trap the pass, or – if things go wrong – have two people press the pass receiver. FC Barcelona used this style often under Pep Guardiola.



For ball-oriented Gegenpressing a team simply goes towards the ball without regard for a loss of structure. This means that, on the one hand, a team can achieve maximum pace and aggression, but, on the other hand, will be vulnerable and simplistic. In the 70s, Ajax and the Netherlands national team practiced this style, as did SV Grödig under Adi Hütter last season.



Nevertheless, one must not assume – and as a coach must not require – that a certain type of cover always be used. It usually depends on the situation and the options available, which are presented by a team’s shape and the type of lost ball. In most cases it is a mixture of these four coverages.

Why is Gegenpressing important?

It is plain to see that Gegenpressing is tactically complex, difficult to perfect, and a physically demanding style. The question is, naturally, why should Gegenpressing be practiced and what are the advantages. The most important factor is defensive stability.

Defensive Stability!

In modern football, most teams can transition very quickly: the players sprint forward at high speed, the players on the ball are technically skilled, and with the ball at their feet can quickly break through spaces and play good passes. The players are also tactically trained so that the strikers or the wingers are already searching for space to exploit, which makes the counterattack even more dangerous. Furthermore, it is at the moment a team loses the ball that they are disorganized, while many teams have established a philosophy of quick, vertical transitions.

If a team attempts to retreat to their defensive positions, then the opponent can advance up the field along with their retreat and quickly gain space as well as play dangerous attacks. Gegenpressing, however, drives the opponent backwards and prevents that. It thereby increases defensive stability; excluding poor implementations, naturally. Yet, Gegenpressing both prevents the opposition counterattack and makes it more difficult to be countered.

Avoiding lost space and a lack of organization

This aspect goes hand in hand with the first. Even if you could consistently win the ball at a similar level to a good Gegenpressing by retreating, it would not avoid the loss of space and organization. After the ball is recovered you would be deeper and in a defensive shape. The great advantage of Gegenpressing is that the ball is normally recovered in an offensive shape and in a higher position on the field. As you were previously in possession, your players were positioned to attack. A quick ball recovery ensures that you can revert back to your attack. In addition, the opposition will often fan out and open up space that wasn’t available before; this synergy ensures the third great advantage, the increased offensive presence.

Improved offense!

After the ball is won in high zones via Gegenpressing, you can either “counter” or “gegenkontern” against a team which has just moved into forward gear. They will be poorly shaped in an unsuitable Dynamik, because they want to establish a broad and deep formation out of a narrow one; while at the same time your team are compact around the ball.

While the pace of the opponent’s transitions is screwed up and your team is in a more advantageous shape (see point 2), you can immediately attack the retreating opponent or circulate the ball higher up the field. It is not for nothing that Jürgen Klopp has called Gegenpressing the “best playmaker in the world.”

Why does Gegenpressing work?

It should be of some interest to coaches as to why Gegenpressing works at all. It is important that your team makes the “first step” in Gegenpressing. If you fall back or retreat, the opponent can be proactive while your team becomes reactive. So, you have to follow the opponent’s choices rather than making your own. The advantage of making the first decision and the first step is that you set the rules and can play specific structures. It also puts you in a better position to act and determine what to do next. The exact application is then only a question of implementation; the biggest advantage is the “first step.”

That it functions not only in theory but in practice and is simply a motor and technical aspect is crucial. The opponent must contemplate during the ball recovery how to attack. This ranges from the looking at the situation and searching for passing options, to the fact that he has to handle the ball first-time when receiving it – which is sometimes even more difficult and technically complicated than receiving a difficult and hard pass. To get into a suitable position to handle this ball, (including making the decision) takes time and can be taken advantage of by a fast, aggressive counter pressing.

There is hardly any moment where an individual player is more prone to pressing than immediately after winning the ball. And that is the big secret to the success of Gegenpressing.

http://spielverlagerung.com/2014/10/07/counter-or-gegenpressing/

[kaz1983]

Gegenpressing Bayer Leverkusen Roger Schmidt was defined by Guardiola "one of the best teams in the world."

Netherlands vs. Uruguay, 15 June 1974. At the third minute of the game the goalkeeper of "Celeste", Mazurkiewicz, gets hold of the ball and used with hands-back Forlan, who tow and raises his head. To prevent the pass line with its center there is Cruyff, Rensenbrink frontally attacks him: Forlan download the ball low shot towards the frontline, Castillo tow but immediately behind him there Neeskens who attacks him and dirty with the ball. Could take it outside Uruguayan Mantegazza, but rather anticipates van Hanegem, serving its Neeskens. The number 17, with his blond hair, had continued the race in the space that had been created, and Forlan, who had started this incredible 9/2, knocks him down.

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/UTiMthZISoU" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" class="bbc_link bbc_flash_disabled new_win">https://www.youtube.com/v/UTiMthZISoU</a>

The action (9:56 min) tells Holland almost more famous of the first minute and 48 seconds of the final against West Germany; (23:00 min and 25.40) the standard attitude of Uruguay; (29.40 min) the pressure in midfield associated with a high defensive line.

Klopp, Guardiola, HeynckesMany of the movements that we see today on the European fields originate from the Netherlands' 70s, between Rotterdam and de Meer. The common thread in all the different forms is the total football of Rinus Michels, that flexibility of role, control of spaces in the field, speed of thought and verticals. Impossible to distinguish where does the defensive and the offensive begins, or vice versa, the team gets up closing passing lanes, blocking the road immediately to the ball carrier advancing.

He speaks especially of possession and attack patterns of the teams "Total", but are equally important movements without the ball. That phase, that is, we call defensive; as it sounds simplistic in the case of a phase carried out at 50 meters from the door. Gerry Gelade and Colin Trainor studied two particular indices. The first is called Average Defensive Distance (ADD): calculates the average distance saved him when a team performs the actions of defense, successful or not. In the 2013/2014 season, the leagues analyzed the average was 39.9 meters: the lowest was that of the Crystal Palace: 36.6 m; the highest that of Bayern Monaco: 46.7 m. Between the two teams there are more than 10 meters away in their pressure, obviously for the Palace is not necessarily a choice, but most of inferiority technique that forces them into that portion of the field. The second index is called Passed Allowed To Defensive Action (PPDA): divide the number of steps that a team gives, for the number of defensive actions made ​​at least 40 meters from the door. Low levels mean lower opponent possession and theft of the ball faster. Bayern Monaco, again, has given the best of all: for every 6.9 passes there is a defensive action in that area of the field. Finally, once again, the Crystal Palace. Here you will find an in-depth on the two indexes. The concept of systematic offensive pressure has different names depending on who is talking about. Klinsmann in 2008 called it "immediate recovery ball". In Germany we use the term gegenpressing. GenesisOriginally there was the tiqui-taca of Barcelona, ​​with the possession around 70% and that opponents were closed density in the last 30 meters of the field. The real problem, though, was that once recovered the ball opponents departed in the counterattack, especially teams well organized tactically and physically strong nullified in this way almost all the technical gap. Mourinho's Inter before, Atlético Madrid Simeon then (against Vilanova) demonstrated the fallibility of a system voted almost exclusively to the creation offensive. He had to evolve, sacrificing part of the possession and devoting more to situations of "non-possession".

At this point in the story (an extreme simplification) enters the scene that Jürgen Klopp with his Borussia Dortmund customs clearance for the first time the gegenpressing. That is, a pressure immediately following the loss of the ball. The whole team in this case pressed as an organized unit in the moment when the offensive action ends and becomes defensive. The eleven players do not escape back but move forward in search of the ball, which ideally leads to the immediate return of possession. This will prevent the restart (the first of the problems of Barcelona Guardiola) and is won the ball near the goal. The success of the pressure depends on the movements of individual players: to chase the ball as one body must maintain short distances between departments without, however, leave uncovered play spaces between individual roles. Dortmund in style, there is a time limit beyond which the pressure deflates, 5-6 seconds, after which the team must retreat (although it always depends on the context of the action) but has not regained the ball.

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/iuMvLWU7SkM" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" class="bbc_link bbc_flash_disabled new_win">https://www.youtube.com/v/iuMvLWU7SkM</a>

You can see how the field is "portioned" in areas such as the opponent's game is brought to the outside and how the movements of Reus Lewandowski or take away the alternative of the central passage. At 1:52 min all the advantages of being able to retrieve the ball thanks to a high blood pressure after losing possession.

The gegenpressing has another peculiarity: in addition to occur at nearly 50 meters from the door, it takes place mostly on the wings. Possession opponent is accompanied to the sideline, where the choices are limited and the recovery easier (in fact it is said that the lateral line is "the best defender in the field"). It isolates the opponent with both central and external pressure, a kind of encirclement which forces it to rifurgiarsi backwards or kick forwards without a rationale. Different stylesHere, however, the styles diverge. Klopp, for example, opt for a pressure on the ball carrier, and then on the sphere itself. So try to force the mistakes of the opposing players, the player who giallonero press first is accompanied by the rest of the team to "absorb" the other possible receivers in the area. On the contrary, the Barcelona of Guardiola used to grant the first step in an attempt to attack not so much the receiver or the ball carrier, as the passage itself. The failure of the action was, however, offset by the prior coverage of at least two other players, and the intensity was less than in Dortmund. To this system was inspired, with great success, the Bayern Monaco Jupp Heynckes (which Guardiola has maintained and integrated). Only difference, the decision not to defend in pressure areas, as it did Klopp, instead trying to match each player a white and his alter ego. The carrier in this case is literally cut off, having no gaming solution.

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/vP397_vH8xo" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" class="bbc_link bbc_flash_disabled new_win">https://www.youtube.com/v/vP397_vH8xo</a>

Note how the Barca of Guardiola has always preferred to close the passing lanes, sometimes even giving more space to the ball carrier.

The advantages are obvious, in front of the enormous expenditure of energy. Everything is organized to suffer fewer attacks possible, preventing the opposing team to cross the midfield with a simple possession which enables it to choose always the best play. Moreover, the system is integrated by the movements of the attackers and the wings ready in case of recovery of the balloon to run in the spaces. The action moves from offensive to defensive and offensive almost istanteneamente again, or at least the idea is that, with a rapid counterattack and vertical (that has facilitated, in Dortmund, the explosion of players brevilinei and fast as Götze, Reus and Blaszczykowski) against defenses unprepared. The goal is the ultimate goal of this defensive system. The uniqueness of SchmidtJan. 18, 2014, the Bayern Monaco Pep Guardiola goes to Red Bull Salzburg Arena for a friendly against Austrian leaders. It comes from the glittering success of Marrakech, which led to the member of the Bavarian club's third Intercontinental Cup (or World Cup). The day will quickly become unforgettable for the Catalan coach, who also celebrated his forty-third birthday. But in negative. The result of the first portion (will also be the final one) reads 3-0 for the Salisubrgo: goals of Mané, Soriano and Zulj. To deflate the predictable comments on a Bayern full of reserves was just a statement of Guardiola after the game: "I've never played in my career against a team with high intensity as that of Red Bull Salzburg."

Roger Schmidt at that time is in Salzburg for the second consecutive year, arrived in the Austrian football from Germany, via Delbrücker (the last club where he played as a player), then Preußen Münster and Paderborn in the second division (other team that had played, about 10 years earlier). Salzburg was a winning team, former coach Ricardo Moniz had just won the seventh title in the club's history, but the beginning for Schmidt is the worst: out from the preliminaries of the Champions League losing against F91 Dudelange, Luxembourg club. The first answers come from the market, led by the neo-sporting director Ralf Rangnick, with its decades of experience in German football. Come Sadio Mané, Kevin Kampl and Valon Berisha, central to the future of the club. The first year finished second behind Austria Vienna; the following year, one of the friendly with Bayern, there is no history. Even in the Europa League the team shines, but stops at the stage to direct clashes. The game Schmidt is perfectly assimilated by the team and fits in an innovative way in the "style Dortmund". Usually the module is the 4-4-2, but changes constantly: on defense becomes a 3-3-4, in attack even a 4-2-2-2 or even a 4-2-4. To do the work are the main wings, Kampl and Mané. WingsThe movements of Slovenian and Senegal during the possession opponent must either prevent the passage on the outside of midfield opponent, which shortens the back for the home, is the shift in the center of the field. The hardness of their task is exacerbated by the fact that after the pressing need down the middle, providing another alternative to center-forward, pointing almost always behind the defensive line. Also under possession strategy Schmidt expects the ball long because of the wing that is centralized, freeing space at quarterback and the depth of the two attackers. A game that requires strength and speed uncommon to outsiders. The tips of Schmidt have an obligation to cut the lines of transition to central defenders, so it is impossible to hold back the pressure to get out. As Borussia, the gegenpressing Schmidt has a limited life, in case of failure to revert to its position of waiting, still quite high compared to the European average. According to the situations it also attacks the goalkeeper; usually it is pressed with the sole intention of forcing him to a ball around outside so he can more easily urge the defenders end in a situation of extreme precariousness. If he can postpone centrally, just like Borussia Klopp, Schmidt agrees that we may lose the second ball, preparing instead the pressure on the next stop. A symbol of the experience of lots of Schmidt on the bench of Salzburg is valid for thirty-seconds of Europa League, 2013-2014 edition. When they stormed the Amsterdam Arena with dry 0-3, with impressive intensity of the pressure. The possession went in favor of the Dutch (60%) and the Austrians, as usual, played a lot without the ball, and only two players have touched the ball more than 60 times. Among the top three of Ajax instead included the two central defenders Moisander (129), Veltman (119), and even the goalkeeper Cillessen touched more balls (92) of any player of Salzburg (a demonstration, also, the need of red and white to engage him to get out of difficult situations).

https://vimeo.com/89108219

The game is a lot of things just explained, (from 1.56 min) as the pressure on the goalkeeper, the reaction of the team on its return, the five seconds after the lost ball, steps 3-3-4 and finally the goal after a recovery in midfield and cutting of the outside (this time Mané and Kampl have reversed roles).

In time, though, the Red Bull Salzburg has been shown to have some problems. Besides the obvious technical limitations, especially in the full-backs not phenomenal, the team sometimes has suffered its own external pressure, especially if the opponents have shown their ability to quickly turn the ball from one side of the field. 4-4-2 is the module that protects more from this eventuality, but within a mechanism so extreme pressure with the coverage of the area depends almost especially from the individual capacity of recovery. From the offensive standpoint, since the ball a key reading of each match of Salzburg , the absence of a pure striker forced Soriano to meet or wings to centralize. It was necessary to create the inclusion of the full-back, or that of Mané Kampl and they won the duel with the defender's turn. LeverkusenWhen Roger Schmidt has decided to accept the proposal of aspirin in Leverkusen, the rose has responded to this problem: there was a bit of weight able to receive long passes from the defense, allowing the cuts behind him Exterior or in front of him a real playmaker. The module has turned permanently in a 4-2-3-1, already tried it anyway in Salzburg with the inclusion of Valon Berisha. Attackers are Stefan Kießling or Josip Drmic, the external Karim Bellarabi and Son Heung-Min, center Hakan Calhanoglu. The turkish is the advanced playmaker who has "the ability to act calmly even in extreme conditions," just what you need to Schmidt . On the left the Korean Son, arrived in 2013 to replace dall'Amburgo none other than André Schürrle.

After 37 games he has already established his scoring record in a year, 17 goals (previously they were 12 on about a dozen games at most). Sporting director Völler has defined fast, agile and strong technically, for Schmidt is an updated and physically superior to Mané. Kießling Drmic are living two totally different moments; the first is running into one of the less prolific seasons at Leverkusen since 2006. In contrast, the Swiss, while scoring less than the German partner, appears to be most useful to the game system of Schmidt (that compares the first Lewandowski of Dortmund), because Search more methodically the race meeting at the ball that is not the depth, which leaves in Son and Bellarabi. This is the great revelation of the year. 24, born in Berlin but of Moroccan origin, with 11 goals in the league it is the first scorer of the team, along with the Korean. Since joining Leverkusen in 2011, he had not found a lot of confidence and was quickly loaned to his former club, Eintracht Braunschweig. After a poor performance with the relegation of his club, Schmidt kept him in pink and deployed holder even the first day at the Westfalenstadion. It took 9 seconds, the fastest goal in the history of the Bundes, Bellarabi because he did not repent. In the rest of the game he has over 14 kilometers.

http://www.ultimouomo.com/gegenpressing/

[kaz1983]

Quantifying 'Gegenpressing'

Gegenpressing

Gegenpressing, or counter pressing, refers to what teams do when they don’t have the ball.

One extreme would be to run back to their penalty box and park the bus there, wait for the opponent to arrive and try to limit space, and thereby the amount of damage done. This may results in quite a few shots conceded, but the idea would be to limit the quality of those attempts and thereby limit the odds of conceding.

The other extreme would be to put aggressive pressure on the opposing player in possession of the ball, and try and knick it from him before any decent offensive move can be started. It will result in a lower amount of shots conceded, but once the opponent gets into scoring position, most defenders will probably be out of place, and high quality attempts could arise.

To quantify this, we will use two advanced defensive metrics, put out originally by Gerry Gelade and Colin Trainor. Beware of some acronyms now.

 

Average Defensive Distance – ADD

This metric computes the average distance up the pitch where a team performs its defensive actions. For all tackles (failed and completed), interceptions and fouls we use the distance between event and the goal line of the defending team. The average of all of those is the Average Defensive Distance. Teams that perform their defensive actions high up the pitch (i.e. far away from their own goal), have a high ADD, those that defend primarily close to their own goal have a low ADD.

In his original definition, Gerry only included own half events, but I’ve not applied this selection. I believe this limitation won’t change the outcome all that much, and it’s probably just easier to reproduce including all defensive actions.

The highest ADD in the dataset for the 2013-14 season (Brazil, Bundesliga, EPL, Eredivisie, La Liga, Ligue 1, Mexico, MLS, Russia, Championship and A-League) is Bayern’s 46.7. This means that Bayern makes its defensive actions just over 17% further away from goal than the average team does. The average ADD is 39.9.

The lowest ADD in the dataset is Crystal Palace, who under Tony Pulis had an ADD of just 36.6. On an average pitch of say 100 meters, this mean Palace defends 3.3 meters deeper than the average team, and 10.1 meters deeper than Bayern.

Obviously, not all of this metric represents a conscious tactical choice. Poor teams will generally be playing more in their own half, as their superior opponents lay their will on them. Therefore, this metric needs to be interpreted with care, and in the light of team strength. The extremes like Bayern and Palace are easy, but the less extreme ADD’s are more difficult to interpret. I tend to think of it more as representing a certain style, and not so much as a performance metric.

 

Passes allowed Per Defensive Action – PPDA

The second metric we’ll use is Colin Trainor’s Passes allowed per Defensive Action. Again, getting used to the acronym probably takes more time than understanding the metric, as it’s quite straightforward actually.

To compute PPDA we divide the amount of passes that a team allows (i.e. passes that the opponent attempts), and divide that number by the amount of defensive actions made. By convenience, we compute this metric over the passes and defensive actions made at least 40 meters from the goal line (OPTA’s 40 coordinate on the x-axis). Colin has explained the reasoning behind this choice very well, so I’ll just refer to his original work here.

Teams that sit back and allow their opponent possession of the ball in their own half and around the halfway line, will note a high PPDA. Lots of opponent passes will be divided by a low number of defensive actions that far from the own goal line. In reverse, teams that aggressively pressure their opponent will note a low PPDA. A low amount of opponent passes will be divided by a high number of defensive actions high up the pitch.

The lowest PPDA (i.e. the highest amount of pressure) in the dataset is again noted by Bayern at 6.9. So, for every 6.9 passes that their opponents make in that zone further than 40 meters from the Bayern goal, Bayern make one defensive action.

The highest PPDA (i.e. the lowest amount of pressure) in the dataset is noted by Mexico’s Atlante for 16.6. Within the top-5 leagues, the highest PPDA was for… Crystal Palace.

I hear you thinking. Doesn’t this mean that ADD and PPDA are essentially the same thing?

 

Combining ADD and PPDA

Both metrics share common ground, but I’d make the case they are different enough to be valuable. What’s more, they can bring even more insight when combined. ADD tells you where teams performed their defense, PPDA tells you how much defense away from goal they performed. ADD is how high their defensive line was, PPDA is how intense the press was.

In part, both go hand in hand. Generally, teams that play high defensive lines also use intense press (Bayern), and teams that play deep defensive lines use low press (Palace). The regression line runs in inverse direction.

The R-squared is just 0.46 though, so there is significant variation: teams play high defensive lines with only moderate pressure (Twente), teams that play low defensive lines with high pressure (Cruzeiro), teams that play very deep with moderately low pressure (Queretaro, Montreal), teams that play average defensive lines without defensive pressure (Morelia, Lorient). Oh, and don’t forget to note Bayern stretching the plot in the upper left corner with their absurdly high line and intense press.

There is a lot of work to be done with these metrics. We’ll need to check repeatability (but from face value this should be okay), study teams that get a new manager (to separate player effects from tactical choices), assess potential league effect (cultural differences in defending style), etc.

For now, I’ll leave you with the big plot, where teams further than 1.5 standard deviation from the regression line have been tagged. Click for the full version.



http://11tegen11.net/2014/11/10/quantifying-gegenpressing/

[warrenpe]

Gegenpressing Bayer Leverkusen Roger Schmidt was defined by Guardiola "one of the best teams in the world."

Just wanted to say a big thank you for posting this - very useful and informative. Makes me realise how little I really know about football.

[Alf Garnett!]

Gegenpressing?

This ain't something new..

Right thro' the 80's when you'd see Ian Rush defending from the front you would often hear someone near you saying..geg 'im pressin.

Ian Rush..founder of geg 'im pressin.