I’m not sure how you spot or develop ‘game intelligence’ the level of ability required at the highest level whilst it can be improved by coaching seems to largely be instinctive. It doesn’t naturally come with quick feet or superb balance, the combination seems to be freakishly rare. I’d suggest you’ll get more success training the physical abilities rather than the instinctive ones, so it is that game intelligence we should be on the look out for rather than foot speed or athleticism but neither is going to be useful without the other.
While I recognise and appreciate the general drift of the argument, I think to some degree on this specific point and others (though significantly, not all), I take the almost opposite view.
Standing on the kop during the Paisley-Fagan-Dalglish years, I believed the crucial attribute that separated us from other English teams was intelligence (and what separated us from European clubs, allying this intelligence with a 'British' tempo). We didn't have a team
entirely full of the best players. They weren't the quickest, the biggest, the strongest. Equally, we didn't have tricky skilful wingers or players like Hoddle and Le Tissier, either. We kept possession, we worked openings, we took our chances and prevented the opposition, largely, from doing the same. If not superior skill, power or speed, what else? Intelligence.
It probably took a decade and a half before I began to challenge my own conclusion based on watching, reading and listening to the players of that era in other contexts. Phil Neal, uttering 'yes boss' nonsense on the sideline as Graham Taylor's assistant. Mark Lawrenson... enough said. Even Hansen's comments on MOTD, despite the initial acclamation of his 'expert' analysis, are essentially cliched and banal; an expert on poor defending, an appreciator of individual skill, but tactically silent, if not naive. Jim Beglin is indistinguishable in his insights as co-commentator from the likes of Alan Smith and Mark Bright. Graeme Souness was a disaster in his biggest managerial role, and (despite the occasional insightful comment) unremarkable as a pundit. Ronnie Whelan - as seemingly 'intelligent' a footballer as any in those teams - tarnished that image with insular, simplistic criticism of Rafa as manager equalling the most dire journalists. Gary Gillespie on LFC TV is dreadful. Steve Nicol was famously regarded as something of a team idiot.
Reading the autobiographies of that era, one is struck by how 'ordinary' they are - the discussion is of commitment, personality, man management and confidence, rather than tactical insight. Read the sparse 'tactical' aspects from four or five of them in quick succession and you'd question whether they actually played on the same team or not, such are the differences and gaps in understanding between them - with one illuminating exception, discussed below (*). The one real exception to this is Dalglish; but as we've seen in the last two years, even he succumbs to British footballing stereotypes at times in player signing and selection.
Perhaps some of this is 'intelligence' rather than 'game intelligence'; but the almost total lack of tactical understanding displayed by the array of ex-Liverpool stars employed in the media - and football itself - suggests not, or not entirely. So if it wasn't intelligence (individual player game intelligence) - or superior skill, size, power or speed - that separated us from the chaff in the 70s and 80s, what?
The
collective intelligence of the tactical framework.
An illustration of this is to accept Vulmea and Mashy's argument that the vast majority of British players were, and are, schooled from an early age in a physical, direct, low-intelligence style of football. Ok. So how many of Paisley's great side were products of a carefully planned and long established youth system designed to counter that failing - the conclusion reached for our modern predicament? Virtually none. We signed players from Scunthorpe, Northampton, Brighton, Partick Thistle, Newcastle, Home Farm, Middlesbrough, Arsenal (more Don Howe than Arsene Wenger), Celtic, Chester City, Sunderland. With one or two possible exceptions, hardly oases of revolutionary tactical thinking, and plenty of them relatively low level coaching setups. Yet these players fitted seamlessly - with perhaps a year in the reserves, though not always - into the most dominant English club side of the 20th century.
(*) One - the only, perhaps - reasonably common theme in the autobiographies of ex-Liverpool players is precisely how little tactical work was done - consciously, at least. Most famously perhaps, Joe Fagan's instructions to Jan Molby before his debut: "Listen, we've signed you because you're a good player, just go and show us what a good player you are, whatever you want to do." Molby himself is an interesting case study of this issue - one of the most 'skilful' players (certainly in central midfield) of the latter half of the Paisley-Fagan-Dalglish era and judging by his punditry, one of the most 'intelligent'. But ultimately, one of the least critical to the system and frequently disposed of; displaced by the Whelan/McMahon partnership, ultimately averaging only 25 or so games per season (all competitions) over his Liverpool career, playing a nearly-full league season only twice, and more than half a season less than half the time he was at the club (injuries and jail time also factors, of course).
The footballing intelligence of those sides, I believe, was inherent in the system (and training techniques) and imparted to the players almost subconsciously. We've discussed this once before, but the key for an individual player at a specific moment during a game is not to be able to consider every possible option open to him and choose the best - indeed, it is almost to NOT consider every possible option: it is for the
right option to be instinctive and first nature - generally, to pass the ball. To a team mate in space, in the direction he's facing, on the floor, with good 'zip' on the pass. That requires good 'basic' technique perhaps more than anything else - the ability to control a ball and be in a position to pass simply with the second (if not the first) touch. The technique and passing tempo is critical, for momentary weaknesses (as and when they appear) in the opposition's defensive shape to be exploited.
In terms of adjusting to opponents shape or style or strengths and weaknesses, this again
should be inherent in the system. It shouldn't require a 'plan B', so much as flexibility. That flexibility is twofold: firstly, the ability of players to do different things in a game; to pass or run, to pass short or long. Certainly there's some decision making invovled there, but it's less a question of 'game intelligence' as recognising the nature of a situation and responding appropriately; which is the sort of thing we test animal intelligence with. A rat or a monkey learns that pressing the red button gives food while the blue button gives nothing. Most footballers can manage trained rat or monkey level intelligence; the key is being able to recognise and execute
instinctively. Again, that requires basic technique and a degree of physical attributes, as well as a training regime which replicates those situations repeatedly, rewarding the correct response and penalising the incorrect one. Secondly, the overall tactical responsibility is with the manager and coaches. The players are busy playing during the game: it is a management responsibility to identify and address, if necessary, overall problems in the system, whether under-performance of particular players or where significant advantage can be gained from relatively minor tweaks (in tempo, shape, pressing, passing distance or depth of the defensive line, for example).
While I dislike the popular notion that football has changed utterly in the last 20-30 years, the one area it has changed is in the physical pace of the game, due to fitness levels, the back pass law, pitch quality, boots etc. So to come back to your quoted point, I think you
do have to select players primarily for technique and pace (in all but perhaps a couple of positions). As long as the player isn't entirely dense - unfortunately, Ryan Babel springs to mind - or indecisive (Jordan Henderson at times), he and the system can be successful if technical quality and a degree of physical quality is present. A truly 'intelligent' footballer - and it's good to have a couple - then becomes a great player and a leader on the pitch. But it's not necessary - it's not feasible, or perhaps desirable - in every player.